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I. INTRODUCTION 
[W]indfall as a term for an unexpected piece of good fortune goes 
back to medieval England, when commoners were forbidden to 
chop down trees for fuel. However, if a strong wind broke off 
branches or blew down trees, the debris was a lucky and legitimate 
fmd.1 
In common usage, a windfall is a "casual or unexpected acquisition or 
advantage," or an "unexpectedly large or unforseen profit." 2 A rare 
discussion in the legal literature did not stray far from the dictionary, 
defining a windfall as "value which is received by a person unexpectedly as 
a result of good fortune rather than as a result of effort, intelligence, or the 
venturing of capital." 3 This definition, however, adds critical economic 
content to the term: It distinguishes gains due to luck from those due to 
effort or enterprise. This Article defines windfalls as economic gains 
independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society 
wishes to reward. 
The common law has long provided clear protection for the fruits of 
labor, planning, and risk-taking. Property and tort law protect Farmer 
Black's wheat crop from theft, negligent destruction, and other harms 
traceable to wrongful human conduct. Contract law protects Black's right to 
transfer the wheat in a private bargain for whatever price the market will 
bear. Modem constitutions, via contract and just compensation clauses, and 
modem statutes, in myriad ways, have further expanded protections for 
private property. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Farmer Black receives as much legal protection 
for manna fallen from heaven or, to use a less religious hypothetical, for a 
golden meteor that falls onto Blackacre. Most commentators simply 
presume, in passing, that the law treats property obtained by luck no 
1. WILLIAM MORRIS & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE 
ORIGINS 605 (1977). For an equivalent etymology, see ROBERT HENDRICKSON, THE FACTS ON 
FILE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 722 (1997). 
Commoners' right to take windfallen wood was far from universal in medieval England. 
Local forest wardens, as a perquisite of office, sometimes had the right to sell "wind-fallen 
wood." CHARLES R. YOUNG, THE ROYAL FORESTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 78 (1979). At other 
times the Crown claimed the proceeds from sales of windfallen timber. See id. at 115, 126, 170. 
2. 20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 378 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. The OED traces 
usage back to Erasmus, who used the term to describe inheritance as a windfall. See id. (citing 
THE APOPHTHEGl\ffiS OF ERASMUS (Nicolas Udall trans., London, Robert Roberts 1877) (1542)). 
Under the economic definition of the term, it is not so clear that inheritance is a windfall. See infra 
Subsection IV.B.2.c. The OED traces the modern use of the term "windfall" to describe 
extraordinary and unexpected profits to JOHN MAYNARD KEYNEs, The General Theory of 
Employment Interest and Money, in 7 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 
57 (rev. ed. 1973). See OED, supra, at 378. 
3. Comment, Taxation of Found Property and Other Windfalls, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 748, 748 
(1953). 
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differently than it treats · property earned through effort. In upholding the 
constitutionality of a Washington, D.C., rent control law enacted during 
World War I, Justice Holmes noted that the measure would deprive 
landlords "in part at least of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of 
people to Washington caused by the needs of Government and the war, and 
thus of a right usually incident to fortunately situated property." 4 A recent 
scholarly discussion of the famous Coronation Caseg5 notes in passing that 
although "this asset came to [apartment owners] by the purest windfall, it 
was entitled to no less protection than any other species of property." 6 
Thus, Richard Epstein accurately describes a "uniform rule [that] leaves the 
thing with its founder, without any effort to isolate luck from skill." 7 
I take issue with this deeply ingrained notion, both as a positive 
description of the law and as a normative prescription for the law. Some 
legal rules do-and should-dictate that the state capture windfalls, i.e., tax 
them away from their lucky recipients and redistribute the gains to the rest 
of the population. Part II develops a theoretical framework to demonstrate 
that such sharing of windfalls is sometimes desirable. Societal capture of 
windfalls, by definition, does not affect incentives to engage in productive 
activity and therefore does not discourage effort or enterprise. Windfalls, 
compared to earnings, are thus an attractive source of revenue. Moreover, to 
the extent that citizens are risk-averse, they will desire, if possible, to share 
windfalls rather than leave them with a few lucky individuals. There is no 
private market mechanism for redistributing windfalls (a hypothetical 
product that I label "reverse insurance"), despite these desirable attributes, 
because parties experiencing gains are unlikely to report their good luck. In 
contrast, those with ordinary insurance have clear incentives to report bad 
luck covered by their policies. I label this the "reporting problem" ; it 
explains why society cannot count on the market to redistribute windfalls. 
The state, however, can redistribute windfalls. Society must weigh the 
benefits against two types of costs incurred in capturing and redistributing 
windfalls. First, there are significant transaction and administrative costs. 
4. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) (emphasis added). 
5. The Coronation Cases involved contract disputes arising from the cancellation of 
celebrations in honor of the coronation of King Edward Vll (who became ill days before the 
scheduled festivities). Parties that contracted for rooms along parade routes, boats able to cruise to 
the "illumination of the fleet," and similar services wished to rescind contracts and recover down 
payments. Sellers of these services, of course, wished not only to retain down payments, but to 
receive balances due. The primary case was Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A. 1903), which 
held that a party letting rooms along the parade route could retain the down payment but that a 
contract was otherwise rescinded because its purpose had been frustrated. For citations to 10 other 
opinions on contracts frustrated by the King's illness, along with extensive background on the 
disputes, see R.G. McElroy & Glanville Williams, The Coronation Cases, 4 Moo. L. REv. 241 
(1941). 
6. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 
HASTINGS LJ. 1, 26 (1991). 
7. Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 17, 18 (1988). 
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Second, any sharing regime that accidentally affects earnings, as opposed to 
windfalls, will create disincentives to effort and especially to planning. 
Another important limitation on capture is that, more often than not, 
one person's windfall is another person's loss. Unfortunately, golden 
meteors fall from the sky much less frequently than people find the property 
of others, receive overpayments, or benefit from other "redistributionary" 
windfalls. I label cases where the number of parties to a windfall is small 
(including both losers and winners) "private windfalls." 
Part III first explores how courts have used and abused the windfall 
label. By failing to appreciate the extent of parties' planning, and the 
productivity of such planning (recall the definition, above, of a windfall as 
an "economic gain independent of work, planning, or other productive 
activities"), courts often find a windfall where none exists (Section III.A). 
Contracts, primary tools of planning, are always incomplete. Courts create 
unintended windfalls when they construe contracts without assuming that, 
had they anticipated subsequent events, risk-averse parties would have 
adopted terms avoiding (instead of creating) windfall gains for one side and 
losses for the other (Section III.B). Legal rules sometimes leave windfalls 
where they land in order to serve larger social goals: Permitting finders to 
keep property when the true owner is unidentified encourages fmders to 
take control of lost items and attempt to locate the owner; permitting 
victims of negligent acts to recover from injurers as well as from their 
insurers preserves tort law's incentives to take reasonable precautions 
(Section III. C). While society might wish to recover other private windfalls, 
the same reporting problem that prevents a market in reverse insurance also 
makes capture of private windfalls unattractive. All the state accomplishes 
by imposing a tax on private windfalls is to impose transaction costs on the 
few parties who must act in concert to keep the windfall secret 
(Section III.D). 
"Public windfalls" involve cases where the number of winners and 
losers is large. Unlike private windfalls, capture of public windfalls is 
feasible. Any gain that looks like an economic rent, from higher oil prices 
resulting from the activities of a foreign cartel to increased wartime demand 
for apartments, presents an attractive target for taxation and redistribution. 
Section IV.B explores a wide variety of contexts in which governments 
have engaged in windfall capture. Section IV.C examines slightly different 
situations, such as eminent domain and punitive damage awards, where 
legal rules should and often do permit the state to buy goods or encourage 
efficient behavior at market cost instead of at negotiated prices that would 
allow a lucky few to reap windfalls. 
Societal capture of public windfalls was not practical when states were 
relatively weak and lacked the information or organizational apparatus 
necessary to separate windfalls from earnings. As governments have 
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developed, however, they have become more and more capable of capturing 
public windfalls. 
II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPTURING WINDFALLS 
There are two reasons why, in an ideal world, the state would capture-
tax away and redistribute-windfalls: (1) They are a nondistortionary 
source of revenue; and (2) risk-averse citizens will desire sharing windfalls 
as a sort of "reverse insurance." I defend these propositions in Section II.A. 
Reality, however, imposes significant constraints on even the modem 
state's ability to capture windfalls: Transaction/administrative costs and the 
possibility of creating disincentives to productive activity (especially 
planning) may outweigh the benefits of windfall capture. I examine these 
costs in Section II.B. 
A. The Desirability of Capturing Windfalls: Optimal Taxation and 
"Reverse Insurance" 
Almost any tax causes consumers to change their behavior. This 
process leads to economic losses above and beyond tax revenues-" excess 
burden" or "deadweight loss" in the jargon of economics.8 A tax on 
chicken causes some consumers to substitute, for example, pork, which 
they might otherwise prefer not to eat; a wage tax causes workers to take 
leisure time that, in the absence of the tax, they found less attractive than 
additional income. Whenever taxes cause individuals to alter their behavior, 
society suffers such deadweight losses. 
Conversely, the less a tax changes behavior, the less deadweight loss it 
imposes. All else being equal, it is efficient to tax goods for which demand 
is inelastic-unresponsive to price changes-since consumers will simply 
pay more rather than switch to a less preferable substitute.9 Thus, a tax on 
the insulin that diabetics require to survive, while perhaps inequitable, is 
efficient in that it generates less deadweight loss than taxing most other 
goods. 
Taxing windfalls is efficient for precisely the same reason that taxing 
insulin is efficient: It leads to little if any distortion in private behavior and 
thus imposes little if any deadweight loss. Windfalls by definition are 
unearned surprises. 10 Taxing unearned income does not undermine 
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PuBUC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 277-96 (5th ed. 1989). 
9. See id. at 293. 
10. It is the unearned feature that defines windfalls. The phrase "unearned surprise" may 
seem redundant Most surprises are unearned (windfalls), and most earnings are expected. There 
are, however, examples of unsurprising windfall-type gains (for example, an expected inheritance) 
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incentives for effort and enterprise; taxing surprises cannot distort agents' 
economic planning. "Of great appeal to economists are taxes that capture 
some portion of windfalls to individuals. If these windfalls are due to 
chance or luck, then taxing them may be less likely to distort behavior than 
would other taxes." 11 Windfall taxation is nondistortionary since it can only 
be imposed ex post, after a windfall, which is by definition an unanticipated 
event. "[T]axing past transactions means that future behavior may be less 
distorted .... The central idea is that allocative efficiency is served when 
taxpayers are unable to shift their activities in the face of a tax." 12 
One court made precisely this point in ruling that insider trading profits 
recovered by a corporation were taxable income. The key to the ruling was 
that the corporation's recovery fit within the statutory definition of income 
as "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." 13 
We see no reason for not giving the statutory language its natural 
meaning, as to the money here in question. It was, to be sure, a 
"windfall" to the plaintiff. If Congress were to select one kind of 
receipt of money which, above all others, would be a fair mark for 
taxation, it might well be "windfalls." That would not penalize 
industry nor discourage enterprise or economy as taxes on wages, 
salaries and profits do. 14 
Windfalls are in some ways akin to economic rents-returns to assets 
that "exceed the minimum amount necessary to keep it in its present 
employment." 15 The most fertile tracts of land, to take the classic example, 
can produce com at a cost below market price, since market price is 
determined by the least productive acre in production (the "marginal" 
acre). This divergence between cost and price gives rise to rents. The cost 
of windfalls is by definition zero, and thus earnings from windfalls are 
and surprise earnings (for exan~ple, a stock in a consciously diversified portfolio that exceeds 
expectations, or a seller landing a big contract after working hard on the deal while still 
calculating the odds of success as well below 50%). That a gain is a surprise, however, supports a 
presumption that it is an uneanied windfall. 
11. Gene Steuerle, Progressive Taxation and Windfall Incomes, 62 TAX NOTES 1197, 1197 
(1994); see also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 
509, 556 (1986) (" [T]he revenue effects of windfall taxation may make it desirable because such 
benefits might exceed [costs] in terms of the optimal trade-off between incentives and risk-
spreading."). 
12. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 273 (1993). 
13. Park & Tilford Distillers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 941, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (quoting 
26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1946)). 
14. Id. at 942 (emphasis added). The Park & Tilford court held that the payment of insider 
trading profits to a corporation from an officer under section 16(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 is 
taxable income under section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1934. The court failed to note 
one reason Congress might not have viewed corporate recovery of insider trading profits as a 
windfall: Section 16(b) clearly aims to recruit corporations as private attorneys general so as to 
deter insider trading. To the extent that such lawsuits serve public ends, they are not windfalls. 
15. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 485 (3d ed. 1985). 
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rents. The most important point, for purposes of efficiency analysis of 
windfall capture, is that the taxation of rents does not alter agents' 
economic decisions. 
Not all rents are windfalls. An oil company that engages in calculated 
risks and discovers a field yielding oil at a cost far below market price will 
reap rents, but they are earned rents, and hence they are not a windfall. 
Michael Jordan commanded an eight-digit annual salary for playing 
basketball because of his unique talents; his wage for any other activity (for 
example, playing baseball) would have been considerably lower. Yet he 
invested considerable time in honing his skills and exerted effort every time 
he played. Hence, his salary was not a windfall under this Article's 
defmition. 
Even if windfalls exceed the government's budgetary needs, there is a 
second reason for society to capture windfalls: individuals' risk preferences. 
There is a widespread belief, buttressed by extensive empirical evidence, 
that people are risk-averse: They are willing to trade off chances for large 
gains to insure against large losses.16 Thus, for example, most people do not 
invest their savings only in very risky enterprises; rather, they choose 
instruments more likely to experience moderate gains and unlikely to go 
bust. Property owners pay insurance premiums in hopes that they will never 
file a claim and thus never recover premiums paid. 
Leaving windfalls "where they fall" means that a few individuals 
experience large gains while most receive nothing. Ex ante, before anyone 
knows who will be the lucky recipients of windfalls, risk-averse citizens 
will not fmd appealing the idea of leaving windfalls where they fall. They 
will prefer to capture the windfalls and distribute them evenly over the 
entire citizenry. I label such a redistributionary scheme "reverse 
insurance." Like insurance it spreads the "risk" of surprises, though 
insurance spreads the risk of unpleasant surprises while windfall capture 
and redistribution spreads the "risk" of pleasant surprises.17 
Those unfamiliar with economic theory may be puzzled by this 
symmetric treatment of bad and good luck. The word "risk" may be one 
source of confusion, since its popular use is limited to bad luck. It is 
important, then, to note the benefits that citizens obtain from windfall 
capture even assuming everyone is risk-neutral. By raising revenue via a 
nondistortionary tax, windfall capture reduces deadweight losses. It will 
16. For an accessible theoretical discussion of risk aversion, see id. at 203-09. The huge and 
varied markets for insurance are perhaps the strongest evidence that most individuals are risk-
averse. Insurance markets and similar mechanisms give rise to "[t]he general presumption in 
economics ... that people are risk-averse over gambles affecting a significant proportion of their 
wealth." ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & EcONOMICS 63 (1988). 
17. While in common parlance the word "risk" is associated with the possibility of only 
adverse outcomes, in economics and finance it refers more generally to unpredictability and thus 
includes favorable as well unfavorable possibilities. 
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also reduce the tax bill (be it income tax, sales tax, or whatever other levy 
the windfall tax displaces) of the vast majority that do not enjoy significant 
windfalls. The expected size of this reduction is far from trivial. First, some 
individual windfalls are large (for example, during its heyday the Windfall 
Profit Tax on Oil, discussed in Subsection IV.B.2, raised over $126 billion 
in 1998 dollars, or roughly $550 for every American then alive). Second, 
the aggregated value of numerous modest windfalls may be significant. 
The popularity of lotteries is sometimes taken as evidence that many 
people are not risk-averse. It is important to remember, however, that many 
of the same lottery players betting a couple dollars a week also spend 
significantly more on indemnity insurance for their homes, cars, and other 
possessions. Lotteries may reflect small-scale irrationality or demonstrate 
that people are risk-loving with a small part of their wealth but, as shown 
by the prevalence of insurance, risk-averse as to the bulk of it. Edward 
McCaffery offers an intriguing explanation for the popularity of lotteries: It 
is rational for relatively poor people to use a few marginal dollars each 
week to provide them with some (if limited and actuarially unfair) hope of 
the good life. 18 
Although it is possible to explain lotteries and other seemingly risk-
loving behavior as either minor deviations from the standard assumption of 
risk aversion or as no deviation at all, studying windfalls raises another 
issue: Are people's preferences the same for upside risk as for downside 
risk? That is, do they wish to share upside gains the same way that they 
wish to share downside losses? Economic theory, as noted above, treats 
risk, upside and downside, as symmetric, and thus it suggests that people 
would like to share windfalls just as much as they like to insure against 
downside risk. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question about the 
nature of common predilections. We will return to this issue after 
illustrating important similarities, and differences, in pooling upside versus 
downside risk. 
There are pervasive parallels between spreading the risk of bad luck 
and sharing the bounty of good luck. Consider the following table, which 
illustrates when conventional insurance does and does not make sense. 
18. See Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wrs. L. 
REV. 71, 93-99. 
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TABLE 1. CONVENTIONAL INSURANCE 
Frequent Infrequent 
Types of Losses Types of Losses 
Large Hell: uninsurable and The paradigmatic case for 
Losses hopefully uncommon. insurance: The modest 
Either the world has gone premiums of the many 
to hell, or the insured are are sufficient to pay the 
unusually accident-prone claims of the unfortunate 
or negligent. few. 
Small Administrative/transaction costs make insurance too 
Losses expensive. 
Since pooling risks via insurance involves nontrivial administrative costs, 
insurance works only to spread larger potential losses. If a certain type of 
large loss occurs quite frequently, however, insurance again becomes 
unworkable since the size of premiums begins to approach the size of 
losses. There is little point for insured parties to shuffle funds into a central 
pool when most of them will make claims roughly equal to their 
contributions. 
Now consider a parallel table breaking down the viability of reverse 
insurance based on the size and frequency of windfalls. 
TABLE 2. REVERSE INSURANCE 
Frequent Infrequent 
Types of Gains Types of Gains 
Large Heaven: Frequency is The focus of this Article: 
Gains strong indication that This is a paradigmatic 
gains are due to effort and case for reverse 
enterprise and hence not insurance.FUsk-averse 
windfalls. By definition, individuals pool bounties 
very few people are just as they pool 
systematically lucky. downside risk. 
Small Administrative/transaction costs make reverse 
Gains insurance too expensive. 
Just as the costs of administering insurance make conventional insurance 
coverage infeasible for small losses, one thesis of this Article is that, given 
such costs, windfall capture makes sense only for larger windfalls. Again 
following conventional insurance, I posit that windfall capture makes sense 
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only for infrequent types of gains. Recurring gains are likely due to effort 
and enterprise and hence, by definition, are not windfalls. 
Another important similarity between conventional and reverse 
insurance is that in both cases, limiting "coverage" in various ways is 
important to avoid perverse incentives. For conventional insurance, this is 
the ubiquitous moral-hazard problem: Coverage may give insured persons 
inadequate incentives to take cost-effective precautions.19 Homeowners 
may not take simple low-cost steps to prevent fires, such as installing 
smoke detectors; a fully insured car owner may park on the street instead of 
in a safer garage; a contact-lens wearer with insurance against loss may 
exercise less care in keeping track of the lenses. To minimize these 
problems and avoid unnecessary losses, insurance companies may require 
their customers to take certain measures (for example, installation of smoke 
detectors) or leave them with some risk of loss (for example, deductibles or 
coinsurance, so that an insured party is not covered for 100% of a loss). 
For reverse insurance, the analogous moral-hazard problem is that an 
overly broad definition of windfalls will lead society to take not only 
surprise income, but also income resulting from effort and enterprise. This 
outcome would create serious disincentives to create wealth. For example, 
from a risk-sharing point of view, it might make sense for all the graduates 
from a class of the Harvard Business School to agree to share their incomes 
after graduation, since luck will undoubtedly play a role in their relative 
earnings. Effort and enterprise, however, also play a significant role in 
determining who earns what, and such a sharing contract would wreak 
havoc on incentives to be productive. Capture ideally would be limited to 
wealth gained purely by good fortune. The key here, as with the moral-
hazard problem in conventional insurance, is to provide coverage-
capture--only for random events beyond the control of the insured. 
Given the myriad similarities between conventional and reverse 
insurance, it is perhaps surprising to fmd an incredibly rich market for the 
former and absolutely no market for the latter. The absence of a reverse-
insurance market to share windfalls makes a prima facie case that people 
simply do not desire such sharing. There are, however, complications 
facing a reverse-insurance market that are not present in a conventional 
insurance market. These sources of market failure, as opposed to consumer 
preferences, likely explain the lack of a private market mechanism for 
sharing windfalls and justify governmental measures to provide reverse 
insurance. 
19. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 65-66 ("Moral hazard is the name for the 
problem that arises when the behavior of the insuree changes after the purchase of insurance so 
that the probability of loss or the size of the loss increases."); STEVEN SHA VELL, EcONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 194-97 (1987) (discussing the moral hazard problem and some 
partial solutions). 
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First, to avoid mangling incentives, reverse-insurance contracts must be 
considerably more complex and variable than conventional insurance 
contracts. Life insurance deals with one very simple and easily identifiable 
event: death. Casualty insurance, whether for boats, cars, homes, or other 
property, similarly deals with another easily identifiable event: damage to 
property. Insurance companies can use mass marketing, boilerplate 
contracts, uniform claim procedures, and the like to pool risks cheaply. In 
contrast, reverse insurance would require terms that varied from case to 
case. What constitutes a windfall, as opposed to earnings, will vary 
extraordinarily from wheat farming to doctoring to steelmaking. The costs 
of serving as the insuring hub in a series of "spoke" contracts with 
variegated insured parties may swamp the benefits of sharing windfalls. 
Even if reverse-insurance companies could set up a series of contracts 
with enough individuals to share windfalls effectively, they would face a 
second and perhaps more serious reporting problem. In both conventional 
and reverse insurance, the insured party is in a good position to observe 
losses or gains, while it is quite expensive for the insurer to detect events 
that trigger loss coverage or gains sharing. There is a radical difference, 
however, in insured parties' incentives to reveal events invoking the policy. 
Under conventional insurance, the insured party obviously has every 
incentive to report losses-she stands to collect money. Under reverse 
insurance, the opposite holds: The insured party will have to share a 
windfall if she reports it, and hence she has absolutely no incentive to report 
her good fortune. To the extent that it is prohibitively expensive for insurers 
to detect windfalls, this dooms any private market for reverse insurance. 
Given market failure, there is a role for government intervention to provide 
some of the benefits of windfall capture that a risk-averse citizenry desires. 
Thus, the paucity of markets for sharing windfalls cannot be taken, 
without more, as evidence that people simply do not wish to do so-that is, 
that people are not risk-averse with respect to upside risk. To the contrary, 
Part IV presents a series of instances in which democratically elected 
governments have implemented complex schemes designed to spread 
unearned gains over . the entire populace. To the extent that democracy 
works and official acts reflect popular will, these episodes constitute 
empirical evidence that people generally are risk-averse as to upside, as 
well as downside, risk. 
A government wishing to effectuate reverse insurance would put the 
population on notice that it stands ready to tax away windfalls. As long as 
the government limits capture to windfalls as defmed in this Article, such a 
policy will not affect anyone's behavior: The government will act only for 
events not planned for or anticipated in even a statistical sense. While a 
reverse-insurance program would have little, if any, impact on asset prices 
the day it was announced, it would prevent property from appreciating after 
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the property benefited from a windfall. Buyers would know, or should 
know, that the government is likely to tax the windfall no matter how many 
times it changes hands. Hence, the value of the windfall will not be 
capitalized into the price of the asset.20 
Before discussing limits on even the state's ability to capture windfalls, 
it is important to note that optimal taxation and risk preferences provide 
efficiency reasons for capturing windfalls: If properly implemented, they 
improve social welfare. The redistribution of windfalls, of course, does not 
increase the aggregate amount of goods available. Capture provides less 
tangible but equally important benefits: a less burdensome means of raising 
revenue and a reduction in the volatility of personal incomes. 
The case this Article makes for windfall capture, then, does not rely on 
any controversial notion of equity, fairness, justice, or the like. There is, of 
course, wide disagreement about what is equitable, fair, or just; such 
notions are subject to debates at least as old as recorded political thought. 
Efficiency arguments have much broader appeal precisely because they rely 
on the relatively uncontroversial proposition that people prefer !!lOre stuff, 
less burdensome taxes, and less risk.21 This is especially true when, as with 
windfall capture, the rules are likely to sprinkle the incremental wealth over 
the entire population, improving everyone's welfare. 22 
B. Limits to Capturing Windfalls 
The previous Section briefly touched on two limits to windfall capture. 
First, administrative and transaction costs make capturing small windfalls 
unattractive. This was the sum and substance of the bottom row in Tables 1 
20. "[C]apitalized into the price of the asset" means that the price of the asset has been 
adjusted to reflect some lmown present or possible future influence. Thus, for example, when the 
value of a parcel of land rises due to the discovery that it likely contains a gold mine, we say that 
the likelihood of the mine's existence has been capitalized into the price of the land. Similarly, the 
mortgage interest deduction has made homes more valuable and has undoubtedly been capitalized 
into home prices. For an amusing and deceptively profound discussion of capitalizing the value of 
the mortgage interest deduction into property prices, see BORIS I. BITTKER, Tax Shelters and Tax 
Capitalization or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, in COLLECTED LEGAL EsSAYS 547, 
547-52 (1989). 
21. Efficiency does have its critics. See, e.g., Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?, 24 
VAL. U. L. REv. 147 (1990); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
485 (1980). 
22. A policy that leaves at least one person better off without harming anyone exemplifies 
efficiency in the strongest sense of the word: pareto efficiency. Windfall capture, considered ex 
post, is not pareto efficient since it leaves the windfall recipient worse off. Considered ex ante, 
however, windfall capture that does not require excessive adminstrative costs is efficient under 
two less demanding standards: Societal gains exceed losses (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency), and over 
the long term covering many windfalls, everyone is statistically likely to be better off if the state 
captures windfalls (quasi-paretian efficiency). For a general discussion of these and other 
definitions of efficiency, see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND TilE LAW 95-132 
(1988). 
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and 2. In general, a society should capture windfalls only if the benefits 
exceed the costs. Capture makes the most sense for windfalls that are large, 
easy to detect, and easy to redistribute. Note that the rise of the modem 
state, with its better information and extensive tax infrastructure, means that 
the costs of capturing windfalls have fallen over time. 
The second limit on windfall capture discussed above involves 
incentives: To the extent that decisionmakers err in distinguishing windfalls 
from gains due to effort and enterprise, individuals will have diminished 
inducement to work hard and produce wealth. And the line between 
windfalls and earnings is not always easy to draw. There is no dichotomy 
between windfalls and earnings; rather, there is a continuum. As discussed 
in Subsection IV.B.2.c, heirs under intestacy statutes may look like windfall 
recipients. While the efficiency arguments for allO\ving them to retain their 
inheritances may be weaker than the argument for beneficiaries identified in 
a will, many of the same considerations are in play, such as encouraging the 
living to work and to save. 
One way to think about limiting the definition of windfalls is to 
imagine what factors very careful, thorough, and prudent investors would 
capitalize into asset prices. If some contingency that relatively careful 
investors might have anticipated increases the value of the property. then 
this possibility was probably capitalized into the price of the asset. There is 
then no windfall, but merely reward commensurate with risk taken. On the 
other hand, some events are real surprises. They are either completely 
unprecedented, or they had such extraordinarily low odds of occurring ex 
ante that even very careful planners would not have accounted for them. 
For instance, I will argue in Subsection IV.B.2 that the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) success in limiting supply and 
raising oil prices in the early 1970s was largely unexpected. While it is true 
that" [e]veryone knows that unanticipated benefits are worth having at least 
to some degree," 23 such surprises by definition do not enter into planning, 
effort, or enterprise. 
It is important to realize the breadth of factors that careful investors will 
consider and capitalize into asset prices-and that all such planning is 
productive activity and hence not a windfall under this Article's definition. 
For example, Kaplow has argued powerfully against providing transitional 
relief to taxpayers harmed by revisions to the Internal Revenue Code, and 
he has symmetrically argued against a windfall tax on those benefiting from 
such changes in the law.24 The tax code changes almost constantly, and thus 
23. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as 
Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85, 123 (1992). Epstein agrees that "the 
social losses generated by not creating the property right [for unanticipated benefits] seem fairly 
small." Id. 
24. See Kaplow, supra note II, at 551-53. 
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it is difficult to argue that careful investors do not weigh a wide variety of 
tax contingencies in their decisions. Similarly, changes in consumer tastes, 
which affect demand, and technology, which affect supply, are difficult to 
forecast, yet one of the keys to business success is making superior 
estimates of these fundamentals.25 Taxing away gains to those who more 
accurately anticipate consumer demand creates serious adverse incentives 
for entrepreneurship. 
On the other hand, the government on rare occasions may truly surprise 
virtually everyone with a sudden change in the tax code. Similarly, changes 
in the fundamentals determining supply and demand may come completely 
out of the blue and catch even the most meticulous planners off guard.26 In 
such cases, windfall capture has the benefits discussed above and yet 
creates little disincentive for effort or enterprise. While usually it is easy to 
determine that somebody earned a gain, windfalls are much more difficult 
to identify. Working in the gray region between obvious windfalls and 
obvious earnings is costly for two reasons. First, there is the simple 
administrative cost of making the determination, and, second, trying to 
draw too fine a line is likely to create disincentives for effort and enterprise. 
Thus, society should err on the side of defining close cases as earnings 
rather than windfalls. 
In a democracy, ultimately the electorate will draw this line. It may be 
politically impossible to limit capture to true windfalls. Epstein doubts that 
there is "any set of social institutions that can both authorize redistribution 
by coercive means and then limit that redistribution to some sharply 
restrained and desirable level." 27 This Article argues that, in theory at least, 
economics provides guidelines for limiting capture and redistribution of 
windfalls "to some sharply restrained and desirable level." 
This thesis in one sense offers a limited, less controversial version of 
John Rawls's theory of socialjustice.28 Rawls argues that, from "behind the 
veil of ignorance," the distribution of individual talent is effectively 
random-a windfall to those with superior intelligence, physical skills, 
good looks, and the like.29 Philosophically, it is difficult to contest this 
proposition. Who can argue that they in any sense earned fundamental traits 
25. See NICHOLSON, supra note 15, at ch. 15 ("Market Demand") (demonstrating how 
individual preferences are aggregated to construct the demand curve, and discussing empirical 
efforts to model real-world demand curves); id. at ch. 7 app. ("Technical Progress") (discussing 
the role of technological innovation in shaping the supply curve, and analyzing hypothesized 
causes of technical progress). 
26. The proliferation of derivative markets-in options, futures, and similar contracts for 
stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies-has lowered the transaction costs of planning for an 
uncertain future. Such instruments, however, have not banished surprises from the course of 
human events. 
27. Epstein, supra note 7, at 36. 
28. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
29. See id. 
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traceable to favorable genetics or environment? Economically, however, the 
point is irrelevant. No matter how random the distribution of talents at birth, 
significantly redistributing earnings (as opposed to windfalls) of the smart 
or skilled dulls their incentives to plan and work, and likely reduces social 
wealth. Put another way, Rawls attempts to articulate a theory of justice. 
This Article limits itself to less controversial efficiency grounds for 
capturing windfalls. That said, redistributionary notions of justice do 
provide additional grounds to support this Article's defense of windfall 
capture as sound social policy. 
While leading to fewer recommendations for windfall capture than 
Rawls, this Article is more optimistic than the other polar position, which in 
effect argues that the costs of capturing windfalls always exceed the 
benefits?0 Moreover, imperfections in democratic politics may well 
produce suboptimal amounts of reverse insurance. While concentrated 
groups facing losses can effectively lobby to socialize the costs of bad luck, 
perhaps leading to excessive social insurance/1 in the case of good luck, 
potential beneficiaries are numerous but diffuse and may be vulnerable to 
lobbying by the few lucky recipients of windfalls. 
Ill. PRIVATE WINDFALLS: 
RARELY WINDFALLS, NEVER WORTH CAPTURE 
This Part consists of a series of negative results on the possibility of 
capturing private windfalls in which the number of winners and losers is 
relatively small. It frrst demonstrates that, in private litigation, courts 
frequently find a windfall where none exists by overlooking important ways 
in which parties make plans (Section III.A). Granting remedies in these 
cases undermines incentives to engage in productive planning. Contracts 
are one of the most important legal planning tools available. Parties, 
however, cannot anticipate every contingency-indeed, they cannot even 
afford to try to consider most of them. Thus, when courts of necessity imply 
terms for parties, they may create windfalls at odds with the parties' intent 
if the judges fail to realize that risk-averse parties never desire implied 
terms that produce lottery-like results (Section Ill.B). 
When there is no judicial error and private windfalls do indeed exist, it 
is often efficient to leave them uncaptured as part of overarching public 
policies (Section Ill.C). Finally, even when they serve no such ends, their 
30. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 28. Epstein admits that "[i]f there were a costless way in 
which the consequences of bad luck could be spread across everyone in society at large ... then 
most of us would pronounce ourselves better off for the change." I d. at 17. He goes on to argue, 
however, that any scheme attempting to undo the effects of bad luck is "prey to greatD 
institutional and practical impediments." ld. at 28. 
31. See id. at 36. 
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private nature makes it infeasible to capture private windfalls: Trying to tax 
them away merely imposes transaction costs on parties as they struggle to 
divide a pie that must remain hidden from the government (Section III.D). 
A. Misuse of the Term Windfall: Failure To Account for Planning 
1. Improper Ex Post Perspective 
Mter the fact, many gains will look like windfalls. Prospectors may 
seem to stumble across gold mines; investors may appear to have "lucked 
out" by purchasing IBM stock in 1950 or Microsoft stock in 1985; real 
estate speculators often look like fortuitous beneficiaries of regional 
population movements. Yet speculators devote considerable skill and effort 
to searching for gold; investors devote time to collecting information and 
take considerable risks; and land speculators closely study growth patterns 
and commit resources to assembling parcels of useful size and shape in 
desirable locations. Examined from an ex ante perspective that properly 
values planning, these are all productive activities that the law generally 
aims to encourage. This Subsection examines cases where courts focus only 
on ex post outcomes, leading to decisions that fmd windfalls where none 
exist and redistributions of property that discourage productive planning. 
Consider the facts of City of Everett v. Estate of Sumstad.32 The sellers 
of a safe knew it contained locked compartments, and their auctioneer so 
informed bidders.33 Mter making a winning bid of $50, the buyers hired a 
locksmith to open the sealed compartments.34 The locksmith found $32,207 
in cash and turned the money over to the authorities. A majority of the court 
awarded the money to the sellers, arguing that the contract between the 
parties was for a safe, not for the safe's contents-that is, there was no 
"meeting of the minds" concerning the concealed money.35 Under this 
view, the cash was a windfall to the buyers. 
As the dissent noted, however, it is hard to imagine more objective 
indicia of intent to sell the safe, contents and all, than the sellers' 
knowledge, announced by the auctioneer, of the unexamined 
compartments.36 The buyers introduced evidence that their bid in part 
reflected a gamble that a locked and unopened compartment in a safe might 
contain valuables.37 They attended auctions frequently and may well have 
32. 614 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
33. See id. at 1295. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. at 1296-97. 
36. See id. at 1299. 
37. See id. at 1295. 
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been speculators in property with potential hidden value.33 For every item 
containing hidden value, they undoubtedly purchased scores of items worth 
nothing beyond "face value." Forcing them to surrender their winnings is 
no different from forcing the owner of a stock portfolio to turn in shares of 
. the few companies that achieve spectacular results. Note that the holding in 
Sumstad will dampen bids for safes and other items with potential hidden 
value-thus forcing owners rather than dealers to bear (1) the risk that there 
is no hidden value; and (2) the cost of determining whether there is such 
value. This seems inefficient, since dealers are probably better risk bearers, 
as repeat players, and able to determine value more efficiently?9 
More egregious outcomes result when courts ignore clear contractual 
terms to avoid outcomes they fmd unfair ex post and therefore deem 
windfalls. The unfairness vanishes when we focus on the ex ante bargain 
made by the parties. Brunmeier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange40 illustrates 
one common scenario.41 The plaintiffs, the family of the victim of a fatal 
on-the-job car accident with an uninsured motorist, collected $25,000 from 
the employer's workers' compensation insurer.42 While the decedent's 
personal auto insurance included $10,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, 
the policy contained an express clause reducing uninsured motorist benefits 
by any amount paid under a workers' compensation policy.43 The plaintiffs 
sued to collect on the decedent's personal insurance policy, claiming that 
the terms of the policy gave the insurer a windfall. 
Bafflingly, the court declared that any way it ruled would result in a 
windfall. It correctly noted that if it permitted the decedent's survivors to 
recover on both policies, they would have reaped a windfall.44 It incorrectly 
38. See id. at 1297. That the buyers anticipated at least the possibility that the safe contained 
hidden value is central to the argument that they reaped no windfall and distinguishes Sumstad 
from the true private windfall cases examined infra Section m.D. 
39. Note that, counterintuitively, the buyers would have an even stronger case if they knew 
that the safe contained cash. Presumably, they applied effort or skill to discover the existence of 
unlmown resources. Such efforts, like high-tech explorations for oil, yield productive information. 
To encourage collection of productive information, parties possessing it are not required to 
disclose it to those with whom they trade. Thus, an oil company is not required to disclose its 
knowledge that a field contains oil when it negotiates to buy the land usually using a "straw," 
since the oil company's identity would tip off the present owner that his land contained oil. 
There is an important caveat in the Sumstad case, due to the fact that the plaintiffs 
discovered cash as opposed to items with intrinsic value. "In the case of currency (as distinct from 
treasure that has historical, aesthetic, or collectors' value), the optimal level [of search] is very 
low, perhaps zero. Finding money does not increase the wealth of society; it just enables the 
finder to have more of society's goods than someone else." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.2 (5th ed. 1998). 
40. 208 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1973). 
41. For similar cases, see Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance, 431 F.2d 212 (8th 
Cir. 1970); and Douthet v. State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance, 546 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. 
1977). 
42. See Brunmeier, 208 N.W.2d at 861. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. at 865. 
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reasoned, however, that judgment for the insurer would also create a 
windfall, reducing the insurer's liability based on the fortuitous existence of 
a workers' compensation policy.45 
While at first blush this may appear to be a windfall to the insurer, a 
moment's reflection reveals that this is a contingency that the insurer 
anticipated ex ante and addressed in an explicit contractual term. It is hard 
to imagine a case of more thoughtful planning. Presumably the decedent 
paid less for personal auto coverage in return for sacrificing double 
coverage in those instances in which he was injured by an uninsured 
motorist while working. Labeling this a windfall is nonsensical; the whole 
point of contractual terms is to allocate risk as part of the total bargain 
between the parties.46 
Courts often improperly consider leasehold assignments and sublets 
from an ex post perspective. A tenant who signs a multiyear lease at a fixed 
rent will have a valuable asset if rents rise. Absent contractual language to 
the contrary, tenants may assign or sublet the premises freely and charge 
rent in excess of what they are paying to the owner.47 Landlords often 
include lease provisions abrogating this default rule, giving them an 
unqualified right to reject sublets or assignments. 
Courts display a strong tendency to imply qualifications to a landlord's 
right of refusal; they fear that free exercise of this right allows landlords to 
reap windfalls. Courts often uphold a landlord's right to reject assignees or 
sublettees when they have "commercially reasonable" objections,48 such as 
"financial responsibility of the proposed assignee; suitability of the use for 
the particular property; legality of the proposed use; need for alteration of 
the premises; and nature of the occupancy, i.e., office, factory, clinic, 
etc." 49 Otherwise, they deem it unreasonable "to deny consent in order that 
the landlord may charge a higher rent than originally contracted for." 50 
Letting a landlord charge a higher rent before a leasehold ends, due to 
the seeming fortuity of a tenant's desire to assign or sublet, is a windfall in 
the eyes of the courts. 
45. See id. 
46. Although the court claimed that the statute governing workmens' compensation insurance 
supports its result, it failed to apply portions of the statute that explicitly permitted insureds to 
contract for as much or as little uninsured motorist coverage as desired: "The named insured shall 
have the right to reject in writing [uninsured motorist coverage] .... [A]t the option of the 
insured, the uninsured motorist limits shall be equal to those provided in the policy of bodily 
injury liability insurance of the insured or such lesser limits as the insured elects to carry." Id. at 
862 n.l. 
47. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PA1RICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 'JI 246 
(abridged ed. 1968). 
48. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 841 (Cal. 1985). 
49. ld. at 845 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
50. ld. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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This is because the lessor's desire for a better bargain than 
contracted for has nothing to do with the permissible purposes of 
the restraint on alienation-to protect the lessor's interest in the 
preservation of the property and the performance of the lease 
covenants. [T]he clause is for the protection of the landlord in its 
ownership and operation of the particular property-not for its 
general economic protection ... [The landlord] here is trying to get 
more than it bargained for in the lease.51 
The courts' assumption that landlords include anti-assignment clauses 
solely to screen for solvent and appropriate tenants seems unwarranted.52 
Rent terms are central to any lease, and it is entirely possible that landlords 
include anti-assignment clause~ both to screen tenants and to reap the 
benefit of rising rents should the tenant desire to exit early. Tenants 
presumably pay lower rent in return for giving up their right to take 
advantage of rising rents. 
By assumption, courts are inferring the unrevealed intent of the parties, 
an admittedly imprecise undertaking. In this context, however, there are 
good reasons to believe that landlords, often larger entities with diversified 
real estate portfolios, are in a better position to bear the risk of fluctuating 
rents. Landlords may do statistical analyses to figure how many tenants are 
likely to exit early, and how early they are likely to exit. Thus, both the 
terms of leases and the nature of typical parties to a lease suggest that 
landlords do not reap windfalls when they refuse to permit assignment of a 
leasehold so that they can raise the rent. By planning for such contingencies 
and factoring them into the rents they charge, landlords provide benefits to 
tenants as well as themselves. 53 
51. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warner v. Konover, 553 
A.2d 1138 (Conn. 1989) (holding that a landlord cannot unreasonably withhold consent for a 
sublease); Jack Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941 (ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(same); Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990) (same). See generally POWELL & 
ROHAN, supra note 47, 'l[17.04[1][b] (describing tenants' broad rights to assign and sublet). 
52. Courts are not alone in making this unwarranted assumption; a leading treatise states that 
anti-assignment clauses "are justified as reasonable protection of the interests of the lessor as to 
who shall possess and manage property in which he has a reversionary interest and from which he 
is deriving income." ROBERTS. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 
§ 8.15, at 578-79 (1980); see also POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, 'l[246 (suggesting that 
landlords' rights to limit assignment or subletting be limited to substantive objections to the 
proposed new tenant). 
There may be rational grounds to impose a clear-statement rule requiring landlords to be 
exceptionally forthright and explicit about an unqualified right to reject sublets or assignments. 
Since they are generally better informed than tenants about the real estate market, the likelihood 
of early exit, and other relevant facts, clear-statement rules may be a sensible way of prodding 
landlords to share their knowledge with tenants. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 
(1989) (explicating the theory that default contract rules encouraging more knowledgeable parties 
to reveal information are efficient). 
53. Another misidentified windfall almost exactly analogous to lease anti-assignment clauses 
came up in judicial treatment of mortgage due-on-sale clauses that effectively prevent a home 
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The way parties deal with the major uncertainties surrounding litigation 
often confuses courts and gives rise to another class of cases in which 
courts fmd windfalls where none exist. Two similar cases reaching opposite 
outcomes illustrate this type of error. The essential facts of Thick v. Lapeer 
Metal Product~4 and Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Casualty 
Insurance55 are the same: A plaintiff had potential claims against two 
insurers. It was possible that neither insured company was liable, that only 
one of them was liable, or that both were liable. In both cases, one insurer 
(label it I5) decided to settle while another Qabel it INs) decided not to settle 
and proceeded to trial, 56 and both cases resulted in judgments holding that 
INs alone was liable for the plaintiff's injuries. INs in both cases maintained 
that the court should deduct the amount Is paid the plaintiff (as a settlement) 
from the damages due. 
The Lapeer Metal court agreed and permitted INs to deduct Is's 
settlement payment from damages, citing "the primacy of the policy against 
double recovery .... 'To preclude credits would allow claimants to receive 
windfalls."' 57 The dissent clearly explains why, looking at the case from the 
proper ex ante perspective-given that settlement is obviously a method to 
manage uncertainty in litigation-there was no windfall: 
"At the time the redemption agreement was entered into ... both 
insurers ... were potentially liable. [Jsl entered into the redemption 
agreement to relieve its potential liability. The fact that the 
[court] ... found ... no liability on the part of [Is] should not 
buyer from taking over the seller's mortgage. In the rising-interest-rate environment of the late 
1970s, courts in a number of states read in a reasonableness requirement and refused to enforce 
the clauses. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978). The courts found it 
unreasonable for lenders to be able to charge higher interest rates simply because a homeowner 
decided to move. As with anti-assignment clauses, however, there is reason to believe that at least 
part of the reason lenders inserted such terms was precisely to provide themselves with some 
protection if and when rates rose. Like landlords, lenders, as players with large pools of loans, 
seem in a better position than homeowners to calculate borrowers' average tenure in a given home 
and thus manage the risk of fluctuating interest rates. Homeowners are likely better off accepting 
lower interest rates and putting all the interest rate risk-upside and downside, given the 
homeowner's right to prepay-on the lender. 
Congress eventually preempted state law and mandated the validity of due-on-sale clauses in 
the Gam-St. Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-230, § 341, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994)). For a detailed history of this episode, see GRANTS. 
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REALEsTATEFlNANCELAW §§ 5.21-5.24 (3d ed. 1994). 
54. 353 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. 1984). 
55. No. 92 CIV. 7327(JSM), 1997 WL 251548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997). 
56. In Squibb, there were actually multiple insurers settling and not settling, but that does not 
affect the analysis. 
57. Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 467 (quoting Stanley v. Hinchcliffe & Kenner, 238 N.W.2d 
13 (Mich. 1976)). 
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negate the parties' understanding that the ... settlement was in 
settlement of Us's] potential liability." 58 
The Squibb court agreed with the reasoning of the dissent in Lapeer Metal. 
Emphasizing the need to focus on the parties' decisions under pretrial 
uncertainty, it refused to order the plaintiff to pay INs the settlement payment 
from Is that 
in hindsight turned out to be in excess of their legal 
obligation .... [The plaintiff], in settling with Us], took something 
less than it might have recovered had it litigated to the end against 
the settling insurers and ran the risk that the amount it received in 
those settlements would be less than it was ultimately obligated to 
pay.s9 
As the court in Squibb and a separate concurrence in Lapeer Metal 
note, the decision to permit deduction of the settlement payment amounts to 
a windfall for INs.60 Worse, the Lapeer decision is inefficient in two respects. 
Both courts noticed the first: Allowing nonsettling parties to deduct 
settlement payments creates a disincentive to settle. 61 Second, the Lapeer 
court's decision results in underdeterrence: Parties like those insured by INs 
will not bear the full cost of the damages they inflict, and therefore, they are 
likely to take less than optimal levels of precaution. Thus, the Squibb court 
refused to deprive a claimant of a fairly-struck bargain that, ex post, 
translated into a double recovery.62 
58. Id. at 469 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) (emphases added) (quoting Thick v. Lapeer Metal 
Products, 302 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct App. 1981)). 
59. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *2; see also Maryland Casualty v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 
99 CIV. 2613(JSM), 1996 WL 109068 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1996) (holding that a liable nonsettling 
insurer could not deduct the payment made by a settling insurer). 
60. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *2; Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 468-69 (Williams, C.J., 
concurring). 
61. Squibb, 1997 WL 251548, at *3; Lapeer Metal, 353 N.W.2d at 467-68. It does seem that 
the parties could contract around this disincentive to settle. Assuming that the plaintiff is risk-
averse, it would be sensible for Is to offer more up front in return for a promise from the plaintiff 
to refund part or all of the settlement if and when the plaintiff obtains a judgment against INs· The 
plaintiff could thus "lock in" a fixed amount, while the settling insurer (instead of the plaintiff) 
would bear a portion of the risk of the litigation with INs· 
62. Other cases have correctly rejected windfall arguments made by parties in the context of 
litigation uncertainty. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 441 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejecting an 
argument that unexpectedly low claims filed in a class action should lead to an ex post reduction 
of the settlement amount). But see Nelson v. Taff, 499 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Gartzke, J., concurring) 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (arguing erroneously that a bankrupt plaintiff obtained a windfall by settling 
a claim with the trustee for cents on the dollar and then later recovering the entire claim plus 
punitives from the responsible third party); id. at 692 (Sundby, J., dissenting) (same). 
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2. Ignoring the Shadow That Law Casts over Bargaining 
People often arrange their contracts and other affairs with one eye on 
the legal environment in which they live. When courts lose sight of this sort 
of planning, they erroneously label as windfalls gains earned by prudent 
planning. Such holdings, like those examined in the previous Section, 
undermine incentives to engage in the eminently productive activity of 
planning one's affairs in compliance with the law. 
Sometimes the errors are facile, yet buried in the twists and turns of 
complex fact patterns. In Ink v. City of Canton,63 for example, the state 
condemned large portions of a public park that reverted to the grantor or his 
heirs if the city ever stopped using the land as a park. The court had to 
decide how to apportion the just compensation proceeds between the heirs 
(Ink) and the city (Canton). 
The court drew a distinction between sales and gifts, reasoning that 
purchasers should receive the entire eminent domain award, while donees 
should receive only the value of the land as restricted, with the remainder 
going to the donor.64 The latter rule, for gifts, may make sense based on 
reasonable inferences about the donor's intent: Electing to place restrictions 
on donated land evidences that the donor attached some value to the 
restriction. Although the donor here, as in many cases, may not have 
anticipated condemnation and thus did not insert a term to deal with such a 
contingency, it seems reasonable to infer that most donors would prefer the 
return of value they never donated. 
The court's rule for sales, giving the buyer the entire eminent domain 
award, however, is obviously erroneous. The court went astray when it 
reasoned that "where the grantee paid the grantor the full value of the 
property for the determinable fee ... giving the grantor any part of the 
eminent domain award would represent a windfall to the grantor." 65 The 
error is obvious: Who would pay "full value" for a restricted 
(determinable) fee? Buyers of restricted fees pay lower prices, and hence 
the court's rule results in windfalls to them, not to sellers. Whether acquired 
by sale or gift, the owner of a defeasible fee received something clearly of 
less than full (unrestricted) value. By incorrectly assuming that a purchaser 
would pay full value for a restricted fee, the court erroneously worries that 
giving any part of an eminent domain award to the grantor amounts to a 
windfall. 
Whether conveyed by sale or by gift, we must presume that the 
restriction itself had utility to the grantor such that he preferred the land 
63. 212 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1965). 
64. See id. at 577. 
65. !d. 
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restricted to selling at a higher market price. The gift/sale distinction merely 
tells us implicitly what the grantor wished to do with the value embodied in 
the restriction: receive fair value himself or donate the same value to 
charity. If and when the state condemns a restricted fee, the grantee, or his 
heirs or assigns, should receive only the value of the land as restricted, 
whether he bought the land or received it as a gift. To give a grantee the full 
value of the land, as the court advises, creates a real windfall for the grantee 
by avoiding an illusory windfall to the grantor. 
One of the precepts for the Ink decision was a previous holding that 
despite any use restrictions, the state must pay just compensation equal to 
market value as if the land were not restricted.66 Ironically, this earlier case, 
Thormyer, correctly addressed a windfall issue quite similar to the one 
mishandled in Ink. The Thormyer court noted that it would be a windfall to 
the state if it could acquire land more cheaply by the happenstance of 
private use restrictions. The court at first suggested that the landowner 
would receive a windfall if just compensation paid her a price undiscounted 
for restrictions on her use. In deciding to force the state to pay full market 
value, however, the court zeroed in on the relevant source for its rule: the 
intent of the grantor. 
It cannot be seriously suggested that, if he had foreseen that 
appropriation by the state, he would have wanted the state to 
benefit from the restriction by being enabled to take the land for 
less than it was worth. To give such an effect to the restriction 
would be to completely ignore and distort the purpose of the donor. 
The purpose he disclosed by his gift clearly indicates that, if he had 
foreseen the appropriation, his intention would have been that the 
restriction be eliminated in any determination as to what should be 
made available by the state to replace the benefits he had provided 
for those whom he intended to benefit, i.e., the occupants of the 
county children's home.67 
Thus, the court was in effect doing no more than implying terms in the 
grant to address contingencies that the grantor did not address explicitly. 
Other incorrect findings of windfalls, such as the major justification for 
the contemporaneous ownership requirement (COR) for derivative 
corporate law suits,68 are rooted in circular logic that fails to realize the 
law's role in private decisionmaking. The COR bars those who obtain 
66. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer (In re Appropriation of Easement 
for Highway Purposes), 159 N.E.2d 612, 619 (Ohio 1959)). 
67. Thormyer, 159 N.E.2d at 618. 
68. A derivative suit is "[a] suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (6th ed. 1990). Shareholders bringing derivative actions believe 
the corporation has suffered an injury for which the officers in control, for one reason or another, 
will not initiate suit. 
HeinOnline -- 108 Yale L.J. 1513 1998-1999
1999] Windfalls 1513 
shares after the purported wrong against the corporation from instituting a 
derivative suit; only owners who held shares at the time of the harm may 
sue on the corporation's behalf. Thus, the COR prevents the right to sue 
from "running with the shares" -a transfer extinguishes the power to bring 
a derivative suit.69 
In defending the COR, many courts reason that permitting buyers to sue 
will result in a windfall: Investors will buy at a discount, reflecting the 
corporation's reduced value due to the harm that gives rise to a suit, and 
then restore the full value of the shares by a successful derivative suit?0 In 
the absence of the COR, however, shares of corporations suffering 
remediable harms would not sell at as much of a discount-any discount 
would reflect only uncertainty about success on the merits of the derivative 
suit. If the corporation was sure to win, buyers would bid up the price to 
reflect the value of the flrm including future recovery for whatever harm 
was done.71 Like the rationale in Ink, the idea that allowing later purchasers 
of shares to sue for prepurchase harms can create windfalls rests on an 
erroneous notion of how parties will strike bargains given legal rules. 
Moreover, it is generally efficient to allow parties to transfer assets. In this 
particular case, shareholders averse to litigation risk wish to sell, and others 
wish to buy, shares with the right to sue attached. 
A similar fallacy occurs when courts refuse to permit sellers with valid 
inverse condemnation suits to sell the right to sue along with the property.72 
If a new statute, ordinance, or administrative rule amounts to a taking, the 
owner of the land at the time of enactment undoubtedly can bring an 
inverse condemnation suit. Courts are split, however, on whether a 
69. See 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRlVA1E CORPORATIONS § 5981 (perm. 
ed. 1995). 
70. See Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974); El 
Dorado Bancshares v. Martin, 701 F. Supp. 1515, 1519 n.3 (D. Kan. 1988) ("[T]he determination 
of whether shareholders can recover rests primarily on whether such a recovery would result in a 
windfall .... "); Courtland Manor, Inc. v. Leeds, 347 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1975); Home Fire Ins. v. 
Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb. 1903). 
71. As long as a suit is possible, "[a]n element of the purchase price paid [would] be 
attributable to the per share value of the possible corporate recovery." Paul P. Harbrecht, The 
Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1041, 
I 062 (1978). Similar reasoning leads Dean Clark to conclude that "it is difficult to justify the 
continued existence of the contemporaneous ownership rule." ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORA1ELAW § 15.4, at 651 (1986). 
72. Inverse condemnation refers to a suit by a landowner claiming that the state has taken 
some action so intrusive that it amounts to expropriation. Since the state has not filed a direct 
condemnation suit in order to take title and determine just compensation, the landowner may file 
an inverse condemnation suit, asking a court to (1) rule that there has been a taking; and 
(2) determine just compensation and order the state to make payment See POWELL & ROHAN, 
supra note47, § 79B.03; 2AJULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 6.14 (rev. 3d 
ed. 1998). 
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subsequent purchaser may bring the same suit-that is, on whether the 
inverse condemnation suit "runs with the land." 73 
Some courts refuse to permit subsequent purchasers to sue, arguing that 
such buyers, like purchasers of shares in companies that may have a right to 
sue, will buy cheaply based on the restrictive effects of the new law and 
then realize the unrestricted value of the land by successfully bringing an 
inverse condemnation suit. "Any compensation received by a subsequent 
owner for enforcement of the very restriction that served to abate the 
purchase price would amount to a windfall, and a rule tolerating that 
situation would reward land speculation to the detriment of the public 
fisc." 74 
This reasoning is deeply flawed. If buyers know the rule barring suit, 
they will pay a reduced price reflecting the lower value of heavily regulated 
land. Conversely, if buyers know that they may sue, they will bid up the 
price closer to the full value of the land, possibly discounted for the cost 
and risk of the necessary lawsuit. Windfalls will exist only when the courts 
surprise the parties. If a buyer purchases when the general opinion is that 
suits do not run with the land and subsequently convinces courts to alter the 
rule, then the buyer arguably receives a windfall.75 As long as legal rules are 
73. For examples of cases holding that a subsequent purchaser may sue, see Lopes v. City of 
Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); and Moroney v. Mayor and Council of Old Tappan, 633 
A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). For a general discussion and collection of cases, see 
Stephen E. Abraham, Windfalls or Windmills: The Right of a Property Owner To Challenge Lond 
Use Regulations (A Call To Critically Reexamine the Meaning of Lucas), 13 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 161 (1997). 
74. Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997). In a similar decision 
issued simultaneously, the same court argued that a buyer's "reasonable expectations were 
reflected by his consideration of the inherent limitations on the property when he made the 
purchase offer for thousands less than its worth without the restrictions." Gazza v. New York 
State Dep't ofEnvtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (N.Y. 1997). 
75. As with derivative suits and the contemporaneous ownership rule, efficiency 
considerations weigh strongly in favor of permitting inverse condemnation suits to run with the 
land. Alienability allows the party who most highly values the package of land and lawsuit to 
obtain the assets. Some courts that permit subsequent buyers to bring inverse condemnation suits 
explicitly discuss such efficiency concerns. See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1315 (arguing that barring 
purchasers from bringing inverse condemnation suits "would threaten the free transferability of 
real estate"). Massachusetts law may be less friendly to subsequent buyers after Leonard v. Town 
of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300 (Mass. 1996). 
The rules against suits by subsequent purchasers of shares or land are highly formalistic and 
hence manipulable. If the rule barring subsequent buyers from suing became sufficiently 
inconvenient, owners of shares or land could place their assets in a shell corporation. Instead of 
selling the underlying asset, they could sell all shares of the shell corporation. The shell 
corporation, not the underlying buyer, would (formally) own any cause of action; as a legal person 
in existence at the time of the wrong to the corporation or the offending statute, the corporation 
would have the indisputable right to sue no matter how many times the shares or land effectively 
changed hands. This use of formalism to circumvent rules extinguishing lawsuits when lands 
change hands rests on the universal power of corporations, as legal entities distinct from their 
shareholders, to hold title to real property. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) (1991 & 
Supp. 1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN.§ 3.02(4) (1984). 
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predictable, prudent planning that accounts for those rules cannot lead to 
windfalls. 
B. Inefficient Enrichment: Avoiding Contract Interpretations That Create 
Unintended Windfalls 
Even the most prudently drafted contracts cannot cover all, or even 
most, contingencies; there are simply too many variables in the world. 
Thus, one of the primary purposes of contract law is to infer the likely 
intent of the parties when confronted with circumstances not governed by 
explicit contractual terms. Unjust enrichment and quasi-contract cases take 
this tool to its limit, implying the very existence of contracts where none 
exist. As the label "unjust enrichment" indicates, courts generally justify 
implying contract-like obligations to prevent one party from reaping a 
windfall at the expense of the other-indeed, courts often use the phrase 
"windfall" as a synonym for "unjust enrichment." 
This Section first summarizes existing work demonstrating that unjust 
enrichment cases are appropriately decided on efficiency grounds: Courts 
imply contracts when transaction costs are prohibitive but circumstances 
make it likely that the parties would have struck a deal if they could have 
bargained. It then examines a new class of cases in which courts should, 
and often do, imply contractual terms: Assuming parties are risk-averse, 
they would not desire provisions that lead to lottery-like outcomes where 
one party gains at the expense of the other via a surprise. By implying terms 
that avoid such results, courts enable parties to economize on the expensive 
process of drafting detailed contracts. Finally, it shows that the same 
reasoning supports rescissory remedies for contractual mistake, frustration, 
or impossibility. 
The law of restitution in general, and unjust enrichment in particular, 
focuses on situations in which it is feasible to force recipients to cough up 
unearned windfalls. "Restitution occupies the crucial ground between its 
much-studied neighbors, tort ·and contract. Restitution deals with 
nonbargained benefits; tort law with nonbargained harms; contract law with 
bargained benefits and harms." 76 The universe of "nonbargained benefits" 
covered by unjust enrichment alone, merely one branch of the law of 
restitution, has always been a bit of a motley collection seemingly without a 
unifying theme; it includes everything from provision of unsolicited 
services to mistaken overpayments to contractual restitution for frustration, 
impossibility or illegality.77 
76. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 67 (1985). 
77. For the most extensive survey of the field, see GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF 
REsTITUTION (1978). 
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Courts deciding unjust enrichment cases often deem an unbargained-for 
benefit a windfall to justify ordering restitution. While the very label and 
most doctrinal analysis emphasize issues of fairness in deciding unjust 
enrichment cases, efficiency provides a powerful prescription for how 
courts should, and do, decide these cases.78 Under this reading of the cases, 
the doctrine should be labeled inefficient enrichment, not unjust enrichment. 
The key variable is transaction costs. If it is inexpensive for parties to 
bargain, then they are expected to do so, and the law will not imply a 
contract when, for example, a violinist plays under a stranger's window and 
demands payment after the last note/9 when a neighbor asks for payment 
after installing a water purification system in a common well,80 or when 
someone washes your windshield at a red light and requests payment when 
finished.81 While the recipient in each case receives a windfall,82 the law 
effectively warns the provider that since low transaction costs make 
bargaining feasible, the law will not imply contract-like obligations to pay 
for services rendered. 
When transaction costs are high, however, it is often sensible for the 
court to imply the existence of a contract. When a doctor provides services 
to an unconscious person on the street, for example, bargaining is literally 
impossible.83 On the presumption that most people would request aid if they 
could, courts will give the doctor the legal right to collect a fee, often under 
the rubric of quasi-contract.84 Transaction costs may be high for many 
reasons. If one ship happens across a sinking vessel, the two are in a 
bilateral monopoly and may fight over the price of rescue, especially if the 
value of the cargo in the sinking ship is much higher than the risk-adjusted 
cost of rescue. Thus, the law of the sea implies a contract: Rescuers receive 
the fair market value of their salvage services. 85 When transaction costs are 
high due to the large number of parties, we have a public windfall, 
discussed infra Part IV. 
There is another sense in which transaction costs are always potentially 
high: It is futile to draft contracts that explicitly anticipate every 
contingency, and trying to do so is expensive. Modern contract scholarship 
78. See POSNER, supra note 39, § 4.13. 
79. See id. 
80. See Levmore, supra note 76, at 71. 
81. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1369, 
1380 (1994). 
82. Of course, one only receives a windfall if the music was enjoyable, the purification 
system actually worked, and the windshield became cleaner as a result of the squeegee person's 
efforts. 
83. See POSNER, supra note 39, § 4.13. 
84. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907); In re Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d 
907 (Mich. 1961); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148 (R.I. 1994); 
REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 116 (1937). 
85. See 3A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY§§ 1-4 & 232-44 (Martin J. Norris ed., 7th ed. 1997). 
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emphasizes the important role the law plays in constructing a large body of 
default terms that govern parties in the absence of specific contractual 
provisions. 86 The goal is to make contracting cheap by minimizing the 
amount of dickering and drafting parties need to undertake. 
Courts choose default rules that they believe the parties would have 
chosen had they anticipated an unanticipated event. While this is often 
difficult, widely held assumptions about risk preferences provide the basis 
for strong presumptions about the likely intent of the parties. One of the 
most frequently cited grounds for allocating a given risk is to determine 
which party was in a better position to manage the risk, either by exercising 
caution or by obtaining some sort of insurance coverage. Another risk-
allocation argument explains many unjust (inefficient) enrichment cases 
where courts order restitution of a windfall: Courts assume that parties are 
risk-averse and thus would not insert terms that in effect create a private 
lottery between them. 
One example comes from frequently litigated questions on the effect of 
a death on survivorship rights in commonly held property during the 
pendency of a divorce or after divorce when the final decree is ambiguous.87 
In the prototypical case, Husband and Wife (H & W) own their home as 
joint tenants or tenants by the entireties. In either case, a surviving spouse 
takes sole title if the other dies before dissolution of the cotenancy .88 Their 
divorce settlement calls for a sale of the house and division of the proceeds, 
but W dies before a court finalizes the divorce. Under a formal approach, 
the marital tenancy has not yet dissolved, the divorce settlement is not yet 
final, and thus H would walk away with the house despite his deceased 
wife's wishes (as manifested in her will) to leave all her worldly goods to 
her sister. Many courts decide these cases on precisely such formalistic 
grounds.89 
86. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 52 (discussing default rules); Richard A. 
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (analyzing impossibility, impracticability, and 
frustration). 
87. The frequency with which such cases are litigated is not necessarily tied to the stress of 
divorce and resulting deaths during the (usually) relatively short period between initial filing and 
final divorce decree, but because in some cases the divorce proceedings drag on for years, see, 
e.g., In re Violi, 482 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1985), discussed infra note 89, or the final decree does not 
resolve clearly the status of jointly held property. 
88. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, '][ 617 (discussing survivorship rights among joint 
tenants); id. '][ 624 (discussing survivorship rights between tenants by entireties). 
89. For a typical example of this formal approach, see Violi, 482 N.E.2d 29, in which the 
court awarded a house held by the entireties to the husband after the wife died. While the couple 
had a divorce agreement calling for division of the value of the house, they remained separated for 
years without legally dissolving their marriage. Thus the divorce agreement was never executed. 
In addition to relying on the formality that the tenancy by the entireties had never terminated, 
the court said that its holding rested in part on a "public policy favoring certainty in title to real 
property." /d. at 32. While certainty of title would be relevant if a third party were involved, the 
dissent points out that it has nothing to do with a dispute between co-owners. 
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It seems very unlikely that the parties would desire a provision that in 
effect gambled on deaths during the "executory" period before finalization 
of the divorce.90 Under the formal approach, parties to an unfinalized or 
ambiguous divorce agreement obtain the opportunity for a windfall, if their 
spouse dies first, but pay via a symmetric risk of a wipeout: Their heirs 
receive nothing if they die first. The formal rule introduces significant risk 
where there need be none. It seems quite likely that, were the parties to a 
divorce agreement to contemplate the possibility of an unexpected death, 
they would include a term dissolving the joint interest immediately. This 
would assure both sides (and their heirs) of receiving negotiated shares of 
the property. And in what one litigant characterized as "a developing 
modem trend," 91 many courts are looking past formalism to the likely 
desires of the divorcing couple. In Sondin v. Bernstein, for instance, a 
couple continued to occupy different portions of the property after 
divorce.92 The settlement did, however, call for division of the proceeds 
should the divorcees ever decide to sell the entire building.93 The court 
admitted that the divorce settlement had not formally severed the spouses' 
joint tenancy, but held that by contract-the divorce settlement-the 
deceased husband's estate was nonetheless entitled to half the proceeds of a 
sale.94 
Gordon v. Mazur5 illustrates another context in which a court 
dispensed with formalism and focused on the probable intent of the parties 
in order to avoid a windfall that the parties likely never intended ex ante. 
Co-owners of a building contracted for mutual rights of first refusal to buy 
[The divorcing couple, H and W,] made clear their intent that the tenancy by entirety 
between them be no longer continued and, the present contest being over whether [H) 
should receive a windfall to the exclusion of [W's] heirs, no public policy with respect 
to the protection of bona fide purchasers should play any part in our determination. 
Id. at 33 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For other decisions following the formalist approach despite 
evidence of the parties' intent to the contrary, see Kirven v. Reynolds, 536 So.2d 936 (Ala. 1988); 
Jones v. Earnest, 819 S.W.2d 280 (Ark. 1991); Bruce v. Dyer, 524 A.2d 777 (Md. 1987); 
Pavluvcik v. Sullivan, 495 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. App. Ct. 19S6); In re Estate of Sander, 806 P.2d 
545 (Mont. 1991); Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); and In reMarriage of 
Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. 1985). 
90. Indeed, one way to recharacterize the formal approach is to analogize each spouse's 
contingent right to obtain sole title as a strange sort of life insurance on the other. This 
immediately raises an important question: Do separated or divorced spouses, still tied by an 
undissolved joint ownership interest, have an insurable interest in each other's lives? The law 
takes a dim view of those wishing to take out life insurance on those with whom they have no 
familial or economic ties. See 3 GEORGE]. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D§ 41:1-:10,:17-:24 
(LeeR. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 1997 & Supp. 1998) (describing the legal requirements of 
an insurable interest). 
91. Sondin v. Bernstein, 467 N.E.2d 926,929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
92. See id. at 928. 
93. See id. 
94. For other cases dividing proceeds after one spouse died despite the formal existence of a 
tenancy with survivorship rights, see Wardlow v. Pozzi, 338 P.2d 564 (Cal. App. Ct. 1959); and 
Mann v. Bradley, 535 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1975). 
95. 131 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 1954). 
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the other's interest at cost should one of thein desire to " sell, transfer or 
assign" his or her interest.96 After the value of the building apparently had 
appreciated, the defendant placed her interest in trust for a grandchild. The 
court admitted that as a matter of law, she had undertaken a "sale, transfer 
or assignment." 97 
The Court nonetheless decided the case for the defendant on equitable 
grounds, refusing to grant the plaintiffs request for specific performance. 
Given the appreciated value of the building, the court found that the 
defendant had made a mistake-she had not intended to invoke her co-
owner's right to purchase at cost. 
While such a mistake might not avail the defendants in an action 
for damages at law, it will not foreclose inquiry by a court of equity 
into the justice of bestowing a windfall on one party because the 
other party misconstrued the technical provisions of their 
contract .... If [the defendant] is restored to her former status as a 
co-owner the plaintiff will lose nothing but an uncontemplated 
opportunity to gather in a windfall.98 
The court felt justified in describing the plaintiffs potential gain as 
"uncontemplated" because it found, apparently without objection by either 
party, that they created mutual rights of first refusal to protect against being 
forced into co-ownership with someone who might prove troublesome. In 
fact, the trustee for the defendant's grandchild was the lawyer used by both 
parties to manage the property.99 Given these facts, we might recast the 
court's holding more lucidly as the determination that the phrase "sale, 
transfer or assignment" in this particular contract really only meant a 
transaction that led to a stranger being involved in managing the property as 
a new cotenant. 
The rationale behind Mazur is commonplace. Contract law frequently 
implies reasonable rules to avoid unexpected results that would result from 
strict application of contractual language. Though a land sale contract calls 
for the parties to close on a given day, the law entitles either party to a 
reasonable delay-without empowering the other side to rescind-to 
overcome some difficulty, unless the contract explicitly makes time "of the 
96. ld. 
97. ld. 
98. I d. at 265-66. The court also found it significant that the plaintiff knew of the defendant's 
plan to place her interest in trust but did not invoke his right of first refusal until after she had 
made the transfer. See id. at 264-65. 
It is somewhat disturbing, and seemingly in~onsistent with the reasoning of the opinion, that 
the plaintiff could recover damages. Perhaps the court could think of nothing better than the 
law/equity distinction as a basis to rule for the defendant. The remaining discussion of the case 
suggests an alternative reading that would preclude legal as well as equitable relief. 
99. See id. at 264. 
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essence." 100 The Uniform Commercial Code permits a supplier reasonably 
to alter performance if the contractual mode of delivery becomes 
impractical.101 Such rules make sense for risk-averse parties and avoid 
holdup problems ex post. They also save parties the trouble of inserting 
boilerplate reasonable terms into every contract drafted. 
Courts also apply unjust enrichment to cases of mistake. When, for 
instance, A pays B' s electricity bill by accident, B must make restitution to 
A.102 There are two strong efficiency reasons for this rule. First, risk-averse 
bill-payers prefer this rule to the alternative: a lottery in which a few 
receive a windfall paid for by those who put down the wrong account 
number on their check. Second, not requiring restitution will lead all bill-
payers to take excessive precautions when they prepare their bills-such as 
checking the account number four times instead of twice. The extra minute 
spent, multiplied by thousands or millions of customers, creates great 
waste, and it likely exceeds the cost of requiring restitution in the few cases 
of mistaken payment. 
More commonly, mistakes occur not between unrelated customers of a 
common supplier, but between parties to a contract. While the law is a bit 
wary of permitting one party to rescind a contract based on a unilateral 
error, in instances of mutual mistake the courts often permit rescission and 
require restitution of any benefits conferred. 103 As Andrew Kull has argued 
powerfully, the contract doctrines of impossibility and frustration are 
substantively indistinguishable from the doctrine of mistak:e.104 
Most modern academic commentary and case law support the remedies 
of rescission and restitution in cases of mistake, impossibility, and 
frustration. The rationale, by now undoubtedly familiar, is that most parties 
would contract for such a rule, given risk aversion, if they anticipated the 
contingency that led to a mistake, made the contract impossible to 
complete, or frustrated the purpose of the agreement.105 Kull, in an elaborate 
dissenting view, argues that the courts are unlikely to do a good job of 
reconstructing what the parties would have done ex ante, and that by 
implying terms courts create incentives for contracting parties to bargain 
carelessly and superficially, since the court will later fill in their 
omissions. 106 He argues that older English case law and sound policy 
100. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-302(b)-(c) (amended 1977, 13 U.L.A. 523 
(1986)); see POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 47, '][ 881[5]. 
101. See U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (1989). 
102. See PALMER, supra note 77, § 14.17(a). 
103. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) (discussing mutual 
mistake); id. § 153 (discussing unilateral mistake). 
104. See Kull, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
105. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 103, §§ 151-158 (1981) 
(discussing mistake rules); id. at §§ 261-272 (discussing impracticability and frustration rules); 
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 86, at 117-118. 
106. See Kull, supra note 6, at 38-54 ("The Trouble with 'Gap-Filling"'). 
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support his windfall principle: In the absence of a specific contractual term 
specifying how to allocate a risk, let the gains and losses in cases of 
mistake, impossibility, or frustration lie where they fall at the time the 
problem arises. 107 
In arguing that many private contractual windfalls are efficient, Kull 
apparently believes that the mainstream view overestimates the transaction 
costs saved due to default rules drafted by courts or legislatures. There is 
strong reason to believe, however, that such savings are often significant. 
The main justification for ornate corporate, partnership, limited liability 
company, and other business organization laws is that they are collections 
of off-the-rack rules designed to save each new enterprise the cost of 
drafting a long and complex set of governance rules.108 Just as the state 
saves each new business enterprise the cost of reinventing efficient rules of 
organization, it can help all contracting parties economize on planning costs 
by interpreting contracts in light of the fact that people are generally risk-
averse. 
C. Efficient Windfalls: Serving Wider Social Goals 
This Section deals with what seems the simplest class of cases in which 
the courts correctly identify windfalls: B and C are fighting over property 
that would best be given to a third party (A) not before the court. It is often 
difficult or impossible (that is, expensive, perhaps prohibitively so) to 
identify and channel property to the "true owner'' or "most deserving 
party." While a ruling either way would appear to be a windfall, deciding 
between B and C may also implicate important social policies. Such wider 
concerns should and often do determine the outcome between B and C; the 
winner prevails not because of the merits of his specific claim, but as an 
instrument of other state goals. If it is too expensive to channel the property 
to A, these decisions are efficient second-best outcomes. 
107. See id. at 5-6 (stating Kull's thesis). While it sounds like a "four comers" approach (to 
the extent that it looks to terms within the four comers of the contract, and no further), Kull's 
approach is more nuanced. Older common-law cases show that a strict four comers approach has 
no need for doctrines of mistake, impossibility, or frustration. See, e.g., Paradine & Jane, 82 Eng. 
Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647) (requiring a tenant to pay rent despite eviction by an invading army). Kull, 
however, accepts the need for rules to deal with mistake, impossibility, and frustration. He says 
the need for special rules in such cases is "best explained as a judicial refusal to enforce contracts 
beyond their original limits. Common sense sets limits to a promise, even where contractual 
language does not" Kull, supra note 6, at 38. Kull apparently thinks that it is acceptable for 
courts to assume that all parties would adopt this one term, but no others, to manage risk. 
108. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 14 (1995) 
(describing corporate law as "standard 'contracts"'); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE EcONOl\fiC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) (" [C]orporate law is a set 
of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of 
contracting."). 
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When F finds property on L' s land, the two often end up disputing 
ownership. The true owner holds superior title to F or L but is unidentified 
at the time of adjudication. The property will constitute a windfall to 
whichever party wins the case.109 Although decisions resolving such 
disputes form no cohesive, consistent doctrine, the true owner is never far 
from the courts' attentions. Thus, the seemingly obscure rule that fmders 
keep "lost" property while landowners keep "mislaid" property reflects 
concern for the true owner. no The idea is that owners who mislay property 
(for example, by putting it on a store counter instead of in their pocket) are 
likely to return to the location where they mislaid it, while those that simply 
lose property (for example, it falls out of their pocket) are much less likely 
to return to a specific location seeking the item. m Thus, landowners or 
finders win cases only as instruments of a policy designed to return 
property to its true owner.112 
A.T. Switzer Co. v. Midwestern Construction113 is a contract dispute 
analogous to such finders cases. Defendant Midwestern, a general 
contractor on a government project, subcontracted painting work to 
Switzer. It turned out that no painting was necessary, but Switzer sued to 
enforce the contract anyway. The court permitted the defendant to rescind 
based on mutual mistake. It was unreceptive to the subcontractor's 
argument that rescission would leave the contractor with a windfall, noting 
that permitting Switzer to enforce the contract symmetrically would be a 
windfall to the subcontractor. The basis for the decision, it seems, was 
minimizing administrative costs: " [l]f it is a windfall either to Midwestern 
on the one hand or to Switzer on the other, the court will leave the parties 
where it found them and will not lend its aid to shift the windfall from one 
party to the other." n4 
The record did not contain the contractor's bid, so it is unclear whether 
the government could recover. Whether the government or the contractor 
109. We assume that F is an invitee who "stumbled across" the property; ifF devoted 
resources to unearthing the item, I argue (perhaps counterintuitively) that L has a stronger claim. 
The idea is that the law encourages F to proceed via a market transaction with L (for example, by 
buying the land, leasing it, or negotiating for the right to extract the valuables) rather than via 
trespass or exploiting a license granted for one purpose to achieve other ends. 
110. See, e.g., Michael v. First Chicago Corp., 487 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ill. App Ct. 1985); 
McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548 (1866). 
111. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THELAWOFPERSONALPROPERTY § 14 (2ded. 1955). 
112. The rationale drawn in the text for the lost/mislaid distinction elides over much of the 
complexity and confusion in the cases. For a more nuanced overview of the case law, along with 
criticism of the purported policy grounds for the distinction, see R.H. Helmholz, Equitable 
Division and the Law of Finders, 52FORDHAML. REV. 313,316-27 (1983). 
113. 670 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
114. Kull argues that the maxim "let the gains and losses lay where they fall" expresses the 
proper grounds to decide a wide variety of similar contract disputes (for example, cases of 
mistake, frustration, and impossibility). See generally !Cull, supra note 6. I address his thesis 
supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
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made the original mistake, the court's decision in effect preserves the 
property so that it is more likely that the true owner (the government) can 
recover funds that it would otherwise lose in a contractual error. The 
government dealt directly with the contractor and would more likely spot 
the error if the contractor could not provide an invoice from a painting 
subcontractor. The decision also permits the government to proceed directly 
against the contractor, instead of requiring it to reach a subcontractor with 
which it had no contractual privity. 
Insurance disputes frequently give rise to assertions that policyholders 
are reaping windfalls in two ways. In the first, the insured has multiple 
coverage for the same potential casualty loss. For instance, in Continental 
Oil v. American Quasar Petroleum/15 Quasar had the rights, under a 
"farmout" agreement, to drill for oil and gas on land owned by Continental. 
The agreement called for the parties to share "costs" without defining the 
term. In the course of drilling, Quasar had a blowout that cost over $2.5 
million to fix. It recovered $2 million on a blowout insurance policy that 
covered its wells all over the world. Unsatisfied, Quasar claimed that, 
because blowouts were a "cost" of drilling, Continental was contractually 
liable for half the $2.5 million cost of repairs. 116 Quasar, in effect, claimed 
that Continental was a partial insurer for blowout losses. 
The court agreed and held Continental liable for half the blowout 
expenses as a "cost" under the farmout agreement. It noted that the 
contract did not require Quasar to obtain blowout insurance, and the parties 
apparently stipulated that Continental was not liable for the antecedent 
premiums paid by Quasar.117 This gave rise to an inference that the parties 
did not contract for Quasar to bear this risk alone. The court argued that, 
from the proper ex ante perspective, any recovery in excess of loss would 
not be a windfall for Quasar: 118 It in effect bargained with two separate 
entities for double coverage and presumably paid for such coverage in one 
way or another. 
Casualty insurance exceeding losses, of course, creates perverse 
incentives to cause accidents rather than avoid them. This is another version 
of the moral-hazard problem discussed in Part II. Agreements that insure 
against bad outcomes erode--or, when coverage exceeds losses, invert-
incentives to avoid such outcomes. Such stark examples of moral hazard are 
rare because insurers usually take steps to rule out the possibility of surplus 
coverage (for example, refusing to insure property for more than its 
appraised value or voiding coverage if another policy exists). Indeed, 
insurance law, under the indemnity principle, makes a strong presumption 
115. 599 F.2d 363 (lOth Cir. 1979). 
116. See id. at 364. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
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against excessive recovery from multiple insurers.119 This legal presumption 
seems sound: Parties buying insurance very likely prefer lower premiums 
with recovery limited to actual losses over higher premiums along with a 
chance to reap a double-recovery windfall. 
Continental Oil is a case that apparently fell between the cracks of the 
farmout and insurance contracts. Had the insurance company known that 
the term "cost" in Quasar's farmout agreement with Continental included 
implicit blowout insurance, it would have undoubtedly reduced its exposure 
dollar for dollar. Quasar itself probably would have preferred such a term as 
long as the insurer reduced its premiums accordingly-why would a risk-
averse insured pay more in return for the chance to win a blowout windfall? 
Similarly, why would Continental put itself at risk by creating incentives 
for Quasar to cause a blowout, or at least to exercise less than optimal care? 
The court's facile analysis of the two contracts (Quasar's farmout 
agreement with Continental and its insurance contract) in isolation ignores 
the terms that the parties would have chosen had they anticipated a 
blowout. 
A common way insurers avoid such windfall double recoveries is via 
subrogation clauses that permit the insurer to bring suit against a wrongdoer 
whose harm led to a policyholder claim.120 Indeed, they are perceived as so 
useful and desirable that the law will often imply subrogation rights when 
an insurance contract does not explicitly include them.121 Insurance 
companies benefit by recovering from wrongdoers when economically 
feasible; their policyholders benefit by the lower rates they receive for 
agreeing to subrogation clauses.122 
Failure to consider subrogation has led numerous courts to object to the 
collateral benefits rule as a windfall. Under the collateral benefits rule, 
which is adhered to in a majority of states,123 a tort victim may recover from 
119. See ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BASIC INSURANCE LAW 121 (2d 
ed. 1977). Keeton states: 
The "principle of indemnity" ... is the principle that insurance is legitimately aimed at 
conferring a benefit that is no more than an offset (total or partial) for accidental loss. 
To be consistent with this principle, the benefit must be no greater in value than the loss 
suffered, though it may be less than the loss. 
Id. at 121. 
120. There was no wrongdoer in Continental Oil-well blowouts are presumably acts of 
God. See Continental Oil, 599 F.2d at 364. Thus, the insurer would need some other grounds to 
extract Quasar's second recovery from Continental. 
121. See 16 COUCH, supra note 90, § 62:1. To serve the same ends as subrogation clauses, 
insurance contracts sometimes include reimbursement or repayment clauses, requiring the insured 
to tum over to the insurance company any legal recovery against the wrongdoer. These 
alternatives, however, may be less valuable than subrogation clauses since the insured must bring 
suit instead of the insurer, yet has little incentive to do so when she must tum over any recovery to 
the insurer. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 238-39. 
122. See SHA VELL, supra note 19, at 235-37. 
123. "The virtually universal rule in [America] has been to treat first-party benefits that 
plaintiff has received as 'collateral' to the defendant's responsibility and not relevant to tort law's 
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the wrongdoer, even if she has already received full compensation from her 
first-party insurer (a benefit collateral to the wrongdoing). In the presence 
of a subrogation clause or similar provision, there is in the end no double 
recovery: The insurer pays the insured's claim and recovers in full from the 
wrongdoer. 
Problems arise when administrative and transaction costs make it 
infeasible for insurers to include or apply subrogation clauses. Then a 
plaintiff collecting from both an insurer and the defendant does reap a 
windfall. Often, however, it is an efficient windfall. Denying insured 
plaintiffs recovery from tortfeasors when subrogation fails would mean that 
some tortfeasors will never pay for the damage they do. That will lead 
potential injurers to take suboptimal precautions and thus to cause an 
excessive number of torts. Allowing double recoveries is particularly 
attractive when there is minimal concern that victims are inducing harms in 
order to reap supercompensatory windfalls.124 
Underdeterrence is the ultimate effect of cases like Florida Physician's 
Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley, 125 where the court allowed doctors found 
liable for malpractice to argue that public assistance and private charity 
mitigated the harm to a plaintiff child with serious physical and mental 
disabilities. While these collateral benefits undoubtedly did reduce the 
family's expenses, there seems little danger of moral hazard here: It is hard 
to imagine how parents could raise the odds of malpractice in the fust 
place, and it is equally implausible that they would desire a seriously 
handicapped child in order to extract multiple recoveries from doctors, 
charities, and the public fisc. The outcome permits doctors to externalize a 
portion of the harm they inflict, leading to underdeterrence of medical 
negligence. 
Ideally, the public and charitable agencies providing aid would take at 
least a portion of the malpractice judgment by subrogation. That was 
apparently the court's thinking in Epps v. Mercy Hospital,126 where the 
plaintiff received coverage under her husband's health insurance for a 
work-related accident covered by workmen's compensation. The court 
determination of liability or damages." MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 676 (5th ed. 1992). 
124. Continental Oil illustrated this moral hazard problem. See Continental Oil, 599 F.2d at 
364. It is precisely in such cases that insurance companies are most likely to include subrogation 
or reimbursement clauses. 
One way to deal with moral hazard and deterrence is to have the state tax away any plaintiff 
recovery beyond actual damages. See SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 238 n.9. I examine this 
decoupling solution vis-a-vis punitive damages infra Subsection IV.C.2 . Decoupling may not 
work in this context, however, since plaintiffs will simply obtain full compensation from the 
source available at least transaction costs-invariably their insurers-and fail to bring suit against 
the wrongdoer. Underdeterrence will result 
125. 452 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1984). 
126. 244 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 
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declared that a judgment either way would amount to a windfall: double 
recovery for the plaintiff or no liability for the insurer based on the 
happenstance of other insurance.127 The court remanded the case, directing 
the trial court to find a way, if possible, to funnel the workmen's 
compensation proceeds to the health insurer.128 
As discussed earlier, however, procedural obstacles and administrative 
costs may make bringing a third party before the court impossible or 
wasteful. More important than the occasional windfall to plaintiffs is 
deterring potential injurers-this is what is meant by this Section's title, 
"Efficient Windfalls." Courts sometimes reach this result by stating a 
general preference for victims over injurers if one or the other must receive 
a windfall. fu Ciminski v. SCI Corp.,129 for example, the court held that a 
tortfeasor could not reduce its liability by the value of medical services the 
victim received from the government under Medicare. " [T]he real question 
is not whether there is a windfall, but rather who is to get it. As between an 
injured plaintiff and a defendant, we have no hesitation in saying that the 
former is entitled to prevail." 130 To restate this rule in economic terms: 
Society gains more by tolerating double recoveries that serve deterrence 
than eliminating such windfalls at the cost of underdeterring potential 
tortfeasors.131 
D. Private Windfalls: The Reporting Problem and Transactions Costs 
Not all private windfalls, however, implicate wider social policies. 
Consider two famous contract cases that have tortured generations of first-
year students and many of the scholars teaching them.132 fu Wood v. 
127. See id. at 343. Note that in Epps, unlike Brunmeier v. Fanners Insurance Exchange, 208 
N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1973), the first-party health insurance apparently contained no clause 
requiring the insured to tum over any workmen's compensation recovery. 
128. See Epps, 244 N.W.2d at 343. 
129. 585 P.2d 1182 (Wash. 1978) (en bane). 
130. /d. at 1184. 
131. Again, note that in health insurance cases, there is little fear of moral hazard: People are 
generally unlikely to risk bodily injury in order to reap a windfall based on duplicate coverage. 
The windfall varies directly with the injury and hence the insured would have to risk serious harm 
to realize a large windfall. If feasible, Medicare should have subrogated rights against the injurer, 
but as discussed above, this may prove too expensive. 
For another case where the court allowed an efficient double recovery out of sympathy for 
crime victims, see People v. Sullivan, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. Ct App. 1998), appeal granted 
and opinion superseded, 955 P.2d 448 (Cal. 1998), which held that under a statute requiring 
criminal convicts to pay restitution, convicts could not deduct payments from a victims' insurer. 
The appeals court in Sullivan explicitly noted that the insurer could have included subrogation 
rights against criminals in its policies. See id. at 445-46. 
132. Most contemporary casebooks discuss the two cases and ask students to reconcile the 
seemingly irreconcilable outcomes. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON 
CONTRACTS 621-30 (6th ed. 1993); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 799-802 (5th ed. 1995); FRIEDRICH KEsSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 84-88, 886-98 (3d ed. 1986). 
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Boynton, 133 the plaintiff seller could not recover a diamond already sold that 
both parties had believed to be a topaz. In Sherwood v. Walker, 134 the 
plaintiff seller successfully sued to rescind a contract for a pregnant cow not 
yet sold that both parties believed was infertile. Professors and students 
have puzzled over which decision is correct and over whether there is a way 
to justify the seemingly contradictory outcomes.135 
In a passing comment, Kull touched on the windfall nature of Wood and 
Sherwood: 
The discovery that a cow thought to be barren is with calf, or that a 
supposed topaz is a diamond, is a clear gain to society; but whether 
the property acquires its greater value in the hands of one person or 
another will normally be a matter of complete social indifference.136 
To rephrase, unlike the examples in the previous Section, there are no 
wider social concerns-like deterrence or returning property to its true 
owner--over who gets the diamond or the pregnant cow. Yet, there are two 
reasons that society might have an interest in the allocation of the windfall. 
The first reason why society is not indifferent to which party receives 
the pregnant cow or the diamond goes to the heart of the thesis of this 
Article. In unjust enrichment cases, the surprise is that property ends up in 
the hands of one party rather than the other; there is no surprise about their 
joint wealth. In Wood and Sherwood, on the other hand, the parties, 
considered together, experience a surprise increase in wealth-a windfall. 
While, as the examples just discussed illustrate, this distinction does not 
matter to parties fighting over the property, it is the thesis of this Article 
that this distinction is socially important. As outlined in Part IT, windfalls 
present an ideal target for tax revenue and for redistribution. Although there 
is "complete social indifference" whether one litigant or the other receives 
the pregnant cow or the diamond, a third choice may be socially desirable: 
tax away the value of the windfall gain in each case. 
Attempts to capture these private windfalls, however, are doomed to 
fail: A version of the reporting problem that prevents the emergence of 
reverse insurance for windfalls also prevents capture in cases like Wood and 
133. 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885). 
134. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). For recent scholarly commentary on Wood and Sherwood, 
see David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case for Mistake and the 
Indeterminacy of U.C.C. Section 1-103,43 ARK. L. REV. 291 (1990); Hoffman F. Fuller, Mistake 
and Error in the Law of Contracts, 33 EMORY L.J. 41, 58-62 (1984); and Ke~eth L. Schneyer, 
The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual Mistake, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 429 (1997). 
135. Kull offers a powerful rationale for both outcomes that resolves the paradox: In both 
cases the court left everything as it was at the time the parties discovered their mutual mistake. All 
transfers up to that point were valid, but all future obligations disappeared. See Kull, supra note 6, 
at 5-6. I analyze his wider and more controversial thesis supra notes 104-108. 
136. Kull, supra note 6, at41. 
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Sherwood. In these "contract" windfalls, two parties know of the windfall, 
and it would be extremely expensive for the government to monitor for 
such events.137 If the parties know that the government will tax away their 
unexpected gain, in whole or in part, they have an incentive to strike a deal 
themselves and divide up the surplus. The parties are in a bilateral 
monopoly, however, and negotiations are likely to be protracted. 138 Thus, all 
the government accomplishes by trying to tax private windfalls is to force 
the parties into an expensive bargaining game. Efficiency demands, to the 
contrary, that legal rules help parties avoid such socially wasteful 
transaction costs. Private windfalls thus are not efficient targets for capture. 
Similarly, it is generally infeasible to capture finds: Taxing them away 
will lead most finders simply to hide their good fortune or leave items lying 
on the ground.139 This, of course, frustrates the primary purpose of finders 
law: promoting the return of goods to their true owners. In some sense, 
then, we permit finders to retain their spoils when the true owner cannot be 
determined as a reward for attempting to return them. 
Capture is efficient for those rare private windfalls that are both (1) like 
manna from heaven and do not come at the expense of anyone else, such as 
the golden meteor discussed in the Introduction; and (2) detectable at low 
cost. Under existing law, however, taxing away 100% of golden meteors 
and similar windfalls amounts to a taking without just compensation.140 
Either the courts must reinterpret the word "property" in the Takings 
Clause, or the people must amend it, for society to capture those rare 
137. Pure private windfall cases like Wood and Shenvood surface rarely, undoubtedly 
because it is only in exceptional cases that the party selling an item with surprise value ever hears 
the good news. The purchaser-recipient of the pleasant surprise-has no incentive to publicize 
the parties' mutual mistake and risk a lawsuit Every once in a while, however, a particularly 
noteworthy contractual windfall becomes public knowledge. See, e.g., A 50¢ Frame That Just 
Might Hold a Treasure, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 1995, at A29 (reporting how the purchaser of a 
frame at a flea market found that it contained a draft of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem The 
Village Blacksmith, appraised at approximately $7000). 
138. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 68-69. 
139. It is important to distinguish serendipitous finds from discoveries made by the 
application of toil, skill, and enterprise. This is productive activity bearing only the most facile 
resemblance to windfalls, and there is no good reason to subject income from such activities to 
extraordinary taxation in the first place. See supra note 39. 
While subject to no special tax, finds do count as ordinary income for federal income tax 
purposes. See Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 812 (6th 
Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding that $4467 in cash found in a used piano purchased by taxpayers 
for $15 was taxable as ordinary income under the broad language of section 61 of the Internal 
Revenue Code). Like any tax, this creates some incentive to hide the find and to engage in less 
finding in the first place, and thus is at odds with the purposes of finders law. 
A contrary holding, that finds are not taxable income, would create powerful incentives for 
taxpayers to recharacterize earned income as "lucky fmds" (for example, real estate brokers could 
claim that they earned commissions serendipitously). 
140. This assertion rests on the seemingly universal belief that the law, including the 
Constitution, protects property obtained via windfalls just as much as it protects property earned 
by effort or enterprise. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text 
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private windfalls that come at the expense of no one else and are easy for 
the state to detect. 
The second reason society may not be indifferent between two 
claimants to a private windfall is that transactions costs may make it 
efficient to award the property to one side. As discussed in Section III.B 
above, the state can save parties the cost of bargaining by setting a default 
rule that most parties would select if they contemplated and addressed a 
contractual windfall. As a first cut, sharing private windfalls seems the 
efficient outcome. On the assumption that both parties are risk-averse, they 
will prefer half-size windfalls with twice the probability to full-size 
windfalls half as often. Put another way, if the parties went to the time and 
expense to insert a contractual term to cover pleasant surprises, they would 
likely call for splitting such windfalls. This formalizes Fried's case for a 
default sharing rule in contract law: "Sharing applies where there are no 
rights to respect. It is the principle that would apply if a group of us were to 
land together on some new planet. It is peculiarly appropriate to filling the 
gaps in agreements, to picking up after contractual accidents." 141 
When valuation is difficult (costly), however, splitting the windfall may 
not be feasible. Consider a slightly tweaked version of the facts in Brown v. 
Voss. 142 The plaintiff purchased adjacent landlocked lots Band C from the 
defendant, owner of lot A. The plaintiff planned to build on lot B and leave 
C in its natural state, and so the defendant granted her an easement across 
lot A for the benefit of lot B only. Then, to everyone's surprise, a local river 
changed course and now runs much closer to all three properties. Because 
of the lay of the land, the plaintiff can build a home commanding a river 
view (and thus of significantly higher value) only if the house straddles lots 
Band C. 
Efficiency demands that the house be built in its highest-value location, 
yet the plaintiffs easement benefits only lot B and hence a house standing 
on both lots formally violates-" overburdens" -the easement. The court in 
Brown admitted that a house straddling B and C technically overburdened 
the easement, but it upheld the trial court's decision in the plaintiff 
homeowner's favor as a valid exercise of discretion since the defendant had 
not suffered the "substantial" harm generally necessary to support an 
injunction.143 Had the parties anticipated this contingency in their contract, 
141. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
71 (1981) (footnote omitted). Fried makes the case for sharing losses as well as gains. There may 
often be a stronger case, however, that in the case of losses one party or the other is the best risk 
bearer and should therefore absorb the entire loss. · 
142. 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). 
143. See id. at 518. 
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they might have adopted a sharing rule, but since valuation is so difficult 
that option might have appeared unattractive ex ante.144 
When valuation is difficult, permitting the plaintiff to reap the entire 
windfall may be sensible under an analog of the Coase Theorem.145 The 
right to use the easement to benefit lot C has higher value in the plaintiff's 
hands than in the defendant's. Instead of leaving the parties in a bilateral 
monopoly or engaging in expensive valuation, it is efficient to award the 
property right to the party valuing it more. This choice obviates the need for 
socially wasteful negotiation or valuation. This approach is similar to 
statutes giving owners of landlocked parcels rights of private 
condemnation: They can obtain easements at market value regardless of any 
higher value they attach to the right of way.146 
When there are three or more parties involved, courts and legislatures 
have another option to achieve efficient ends: assigning property rights to 
encourage competition (and thus efficient cost-pricing). Litigation over 
utility easements, for example, often involves multiple holders of vaguely 
specified rights.147 The electricity company may have an easement over 
each lot in a subdivision and, in turn, may have granted the telephone 
company the right to use these easements for, say, "lines transmitting voice 
and data." The cable television company then talks to both about buying 
easements for its lines. The electricity company claims the right to control 
use by virtue of its original easement; the phone company argues that cable 
TV signals are "data" and hence it has the exclusive rights to permit (and 
charge for) cable wire easements. The landowner may claim she granted the 
utility the right only to run power lines and that she alone had the right to 
permit use by the phone and cable companies. 
Instead of assigning absolute property rights to the utility, the phone 
company, or the landowners, a court or legislature could deem existing 
property rights ambiguous and declare that all three have the right to sell an 
144. The court could infer that the parties would have agreed to hire an impartial land 
appraiser to estimate the incremental value of a house straddling the two lots, but such an 
appraisal itself may be expensive. 
145. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. I (1960). 
146. Contrary to appearances, private condemnation is not a form of sharing. The condemner 
pays a fixed value-the cost of her imposition-that is unrelated to the size of any windfall. 
Similarly, the law of salvage limits awards to the reasonable cost of the rescue, which is 
supposedly independent of the value of the cargo saved. See 3A BENEDICT ON AD:MIRALTY, supra 
note 85, §§ 1-4. 
In Brown, the likely cost of the additional easement would be zero, since the path already 
existed and the plaintiff's technical overburdening was in reality no additional burden at all. See 
Brown, 715 P.2d at 518. 
147. See, e.g., CIR TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994); Centel Cable 
Television v. Cook, 567 N.E.2d 1010 (Ohio 1991). See generally JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND!][ 12.07 (1995 & Supp. 1998) 
(collecting cases). 
HeinOnline -- 108 Yale L.J. 1531 1998-1999
1999] Windfalls 1531 
easement to the cable company. This eliminates a bilateral monopoly 
problem and insures that the new user can buy at a competitive price.148 
IV. PuBLIC WINDFALLS 
So far this Article has in the main presented only negative results. Part 
II showed that due to the reporting problem-those experiencing good luck 
will hide gains-there will be no private market for the "reverse insurance" 
that risk-averse people likely desire. Part III first documented misuse of the 
term "windfall." It then described reasons for avoiding contract 
constructions that create windfalls and reasons that many windfalls cannot 
be returned to their true owners. Finally, Part III demonstrated that even in 
the remaining cases of private windfalls, capture is infeasible. 
At a more general level, it is not surprising that common-law litigation 
turns out to be a weak mechanism for the efficient taxation and 
redistribution of windfalls. Commentators demonstrated that courts possess 
quite limited mechanisms for implementing widespread redistribution149 
and, more generally, labor at serious disadvantages compared to tax-based 
regimes. 150 The previous Parts provided additional insight into the common 
law's weakness as a means of redistributing windfalls. Reverse insurance, 
like ordinary insurance, requires the combination (pooling) of a large group 
of people. For ordinary insurance, the many make small contributions to 
cover the losses of the few; for reverse insurance, the few share their 
windfalls with the many. Private markets for ordinary insurance achieve 
pooling via large insurance companies that combine thousands or even 
millions of insurance buyers into a common pool. Common-law litigation 
has no such hub and thus cannot construct a very effective pool of windfall 
recipients. 
Thus, those who question the wisdom of spreading risks via the legal 
system set up a straw man when they demonstrate that the common law of 
property, contracts, and torts is wholly inadequate to the task. Epstein, one 
such critic, implicitly admits as much. After persuasively illustrating the 
common law's shortcomings as a mechanism for risk-spreading, he moves 
on to the more plausible mechanisms examined in this Part. "[P]rocedural 
complications [with common law risk-spreading] thus drive us to a very 
different, administrative solution, in which state officials have the power to 
148. This assumes that the new use has no negative effect on existing uses. 
149. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 570. Recall the difficulty courts have in cases involving 
only three parties: Two parties fight over proceeds that properly belong to a third. See supra 
Section ill.C. 
150. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
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tax the public at large in order to dispense needed payments to persons who 
have suffered the requisite level of misfortune." 151 
Epstein is extremely pessimistic about the efficacy of any such 
"administrative solution" rooted in "the power to tax." His doubt stems in 
part from his failure to treat bad luck and good luck as analytically distinct. 
Since there is no market failure for ordinary insurance (against bad luck), 
he seems to imply that the nonexis.tence of a market for reverse insurance 
merely reflects consumers' preferences. For good luck, however, we have 
seen that the market fails. Windfalls must be pooled, if at all, by the 
government. 
While the reporting problem and the cost of monitoring make capturing 
private windfalls economically undesirable, neither stands in the way of 
capturing public windfalls: Events affecting a broad swath of the population 
are not secrets and the cost of monitoring for them is effectively zero. This 
Part provides grounds for a moderately sanguine view of advanced 
societies' opportunities to share public windfalls. It provides a series of 
historical examples, from early American land law to insider trading, 
showing that legislatures and executives have long used a variety of 
mechanisms to assure that windfalls are shared among the citizenry. On rare 
occasions, such sharing can be tailored closely to redistribute from winners 
to losers, as illustrated in Section IV.A. The remainder of Part IV studies 
cases of less finely tuned capture of windfalls. Section IV.B deals with 
cases where the government extracts windfalls directly from their lucky 
recipients and spreads the benefit over the populace. Section IV.C examines 
structurally different but distributionally similar cases, where the 
government makes sure it pays no more than cost when it needs something 
from citizens, be it their property or their services as private attorneys 
general. In all three contexts, developed bureaucracies and relatively 
efficient information gathering and processing have greatly expanded 
modern nations' ability to capture windfalls. 
A. Tightly Coupled Windfall Capture 
When independent participants involved in some enterprise know that 
"dumb luck" will have a significant effect on who flourishes and who fails, 
there is a strong incentive to strike some sort of risk-pooling agreement ex 
ante. Risk-averse actors prefer predictable, middling income to chances for 
reaping windfalls purchased with the risk of starvation. Those constructing 
such insurance pools, of course, must make sure to preserve incentives for 
effort and enterprise. This Section examines two historical examples of 
151. Epstein, supra note 7, at 30. Epstein addresses bad luck, but he treats good and bad luck 
symmetrically, overlooking the reporting problem. 
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risk-management devices. Relatively primitive medieval governments were 
simply incapable of windfall capture, yet their open-field system of 
agriculture was an impressive tightly coupled insurance scheme. Over the 
last hundred years, modem governments have experimented with measures 
to make beneficiaries, instead of the public at large, pay landowners 
economically harmed by zoning and land use controls. It is a testimonial to 
the difficulty of such closely tailored windfall capture that these measures 
have had, at best, mixed success. 
The medieval open-field agriculture system was an ingenious 
institution for pooling risk while maintaining incentives.152 Productivity of 
adjacent land varies significantly because of soil quality and localized 
incidence of weather (for example, hail) and pests (vermin and microbes). 
One way to minimize the risk of a family starving due to an unusually 
unlucky growing season would have been communal farming: All families 
work on all the village's arable land as a group and divide up the harvest 
per capita. As catastrophic experiments with collective agriculture during 
this century have demonstrated beyond peradventure, 153 however, 
communal production creates irresistible incentives to free ride on the work 
of others. 
The open-field system granted each family property rights in randomly 
distributed strips of land scattered throughout village lands. Thus, if hail 
destroyed crops in the northern half of the fields, everyone suffered nearly 
equal losses. Yet each family's remaining harvest, taken from their strips in 
the unharmed southern fields, would depend directly on their own sweat 
and toil. Giving each family one large block of land, instead of scattered 
strips, would preserve incentives to work hard, but it would result in 
windfalls for some and wipeouts for others. Dividing land holdings into 
noncontiguous strips was a simple means to spread risks. 
A set of modem statutes around the globe have attempted to make those 
receiving windfalls due to government projects, land use, and regulation 
pay off those harmed by the same measures.154 Perhaps the most common 
152. The following discussion draws heavily on Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 
YALE L.J. 1315, 1388-91 (1993), which contains numerous references to historical and economic 
analyses of medieval open-field agriculture. 
153. For a detailed summary of the tragedy resulting from Soviet attempts to collectivize 
agriculture, see DMITRI VOLKOGONOV, STALIN: TRIUMPH AND 'TRAGEDY (Harold Shukman ed. 
& trans., 1991). On China, see JONATHAN D. SPENCE, 'THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 583 
( 1990) (describing the result of collectivization efforts in Mao's "Great Leap Forward" in the late 
1950s as "famine on a gigantic scale, a famine that claimed 20 million lives or more between 
1959 and 1962" ). For a discussion of the more recent failure of communal agriculture in Ethiopia, 
see DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS, RED TEARS: WAR, FAMINE AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA 265-80 
(1989). For additional citations documenting the almost universal failure of collectivized 
agriculture, see Ellickson, supra note 152, at 1318 nn.4-7, 1335 nn.73 & 75. 
154. For an extensive review of these laws and related policy discussions, see WINDFALLS 
FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. 
Misczynski eds., 1978). The editors use a subject-specific definition: "A windfall,. broadly 
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example is rezoning. When a locality rezones a lot from, say, multifamily 
dwellings to open space, the market value of the lot falls precipitously-a 
wipeout.155 Adjacent owners, conversely, receive a windfall in the form of a 
quiet park or forest next door instead of noisy neighbors. The owner of the 
rezoned lot, of course, likely has a takings claim and can sue the state for 
just compensation. Many governments have searched for ways to reduce or 
eliminate government payment by raising compensation for harmed 
landowners from the benefited neighbors, instead of making all citizens pay 
via the public fisc. 156 
All measures taxing benefited landowners to fund those harmed by 
governmental action share some of the flavor of the venerable mechanism 
of special assessments, 157 where, for example, those serviced by a new road 
or sewer line pay a one-time tax (that is, a special assessment) to cover the 
cost of the project. Matters become more complex, however, when 
government action harms as well as helps landowners. One early attempt to 
circumvent takings challenges to zoning, pretty much explained by the 
accurate if loquacious title "Zoning by Special Assessment Financed 
Eminent Domain" (ZSAFED), called for special assessments against those 
benefited to fund payments to those harmed. ZSAFEDs date back over a 
hundred years; despite surviving constitutional challenges, they fell into 
disfavor due to administrative expenses, especially in connection with the 
difficulty of quantifying the size of the gains and losses to all affected 
parcels. 158 
More recent attempts to capture windfalls arising from governmental 
action, called Special Capital and Real Estate Windfall Taxes (SCREWTs), 
in effect give up the effort to tax property-value increases precisely due to 
conceived, is an increase in property value caused by public action; a wipeout is an analogous 
decrease." Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski, Introduction to WINDFALLS FOR 
WIPEOUTS, supra, at 1, 1. 
155. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992). 
156. See Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski, Executive Summary, in WINDFALLS FOR 
WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at xxix, xl-xli. 
157. Special assessments date back to at least 1287, when an ordinance required residents of 
Sussex, England, to pay for shoring up a sea wall. The statute based assessments on the size of a 
landowner's acreage that benefited from the sea wall. See EDWIN CANNAN, THE HISTORY OF 
LoCAL RATES IN ENGLAND II (1912). By the 1890s, special assessments were common practice 
in the United States. See TAX FOUND., SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND SERVICE CHARGES IN 
MUNICIPAL FINANCE 8 (1970). 
158. Apparently, homeowners on Gladstone Boulevard in Kansas City, Missouri, were the 
first to prod a locality to adopt a ZSAFED in order to preserve the residential character of their 
neighborhood. Thirty years later the statute survived a constitutional challenge. See In re Kansas 
City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo. 1923) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
ZSAFED against, inter alia, a challenge that the benefit for homeowners in one neighborhood was 
not a public use for which the state could invoke its takings power). For additional history and 
analysis of ZSAFEDs in both the United States and abroad, see Douglas G. Hagman, Bettennent 
for Worsement: The English 1909 Act and Its Progeny, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 
154, at 491; and Donald G. Hagman, Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Zone 
(ZSAFED ), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at 517. 
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governmental action; instead, they tax the increase in property values 
between purchase and sale, much like a capital gains tax. A number of local 
jurisdictions in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
employ taxes of this type. Though simpler than ZSAFEDs, SCREWTs are 
still relatively complex; their usefulness for capturing windfalls at 
reasonable costs is unclear, and thus so is their future.159 
The windfall capture mechanisms examined in the remainder of Part IV 
inure to the benefit of the entire taxpaying public, either through greater tax 
revenue (Section IV.B) or lower governmental expenditures (Section IV.C). 
These two categories differ significantly in structure but not in substance. 
Section IV.B examines the simpler case, in which someone receives a 
windfall and the government captures it via taxation. Section IV.C 
considers situations in which a citizen holds some property (or property-
like) right that surprisingly becomes of enhanced value to the public. While 
the government could pay a high price and then turn around and assess a 
windfall tax, it is administratively cheaper to establish rules allowing the 
government to obtain the good at a lower price that does not impound any 
windfall "premium." While the means differ, the end is the same in both 
cases: spread the value of a windfall over all or most of the citizenry. In 
some cases, spreading the windfall over the entire population is desirable: 
for example, when selling government lands (in theory owned by the 
citizenry per capita) that may have valuable minerals. In other cases, there 
is a narrower group to whom society would like to channel the windfall 
(e.g., oil consumers in the case of the Windfall Profit Tax on Oil after the 
OPEC embargo), but such precision is administratively too costly. 
B. State Extraction of Windfalls 
1. American Soil and Its Riches 
At its independence, the United States took title to millions of 
uninhabited and unexplored acres.160 For over 100 years, perhaps the single 
most important function of the federal government was selling off these 
vast holdings. While many characteristics contributing to the value of a 
given section were widely known (for example, proximity to lakes, rivers, 
roads, or towns; climate; danger from Native Americans), other important 
159. See Madelyn Glickfield & Donald G. Hagman, Special Capital and Real Estate 
lVindfalls Taxes (SCRElVTs), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 154, at 437 & back leaf 
tb1.20-l. 
160. The individual states originally held title to Western lands, but, after considerable 
haggling, each ceded its holdings to the federal government. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORYOFTHEAMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at225-38 (1940). 
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attributes remained the secrets of a few men or the secrets of nature. 
Surveyors, often the first and only Europeans to scout land before sale, had 
unmatched knowledge about soil quality, for instance. At times, they 
acquired much more valuable information, such as the location of a 
saltlick161 or a mine. Everyone knew, however, that many mines (for coal, 
lead, and precious metals) undoubtedly lay hidden on plain-looking 
acreage. 
In 1781, even before the United States had won its independence, 
Pelatiah Webster voiced concern that valuable acres would fall into private 
hands without payment of fair consideration. He proposed that 
all saltlicks, and mines ... and all [valuable minerals] ... 'in which 
the country greatly abounds,' may be reserved and sequestered for 
public use: a great revenue may grow out of them: and it seems 
unreasonable that those vast sources of wealth should be engrossed 
and monopolized by any individuals .... [T]he vast profits issuing 
from them should flow into the public treasury, and thereby inure to 
the advantage of the whole community.162 
There are two potential worries here, and Webster may have 
contemplated both. First, ·the United States as the selling principal needed to 
guard against unfaithful agents colluding with buyers. A surveyor who 
knew the location of a lead mine, for instance, could sell the information, 
bid on the land himself, or enter into a secret partnership with other 
buyers.163 George Washington seemed concerned about such disloyalty 
when he asked an associate about a potential safeguard: 
Would there be any impropriety do you think sir, in reserving for 
special sale, all Mines, minerals and Salt springs in the general 
Grants of Land belonging to the United States. The Public, instead 
of the few knowing ones, might in this case derive the benefits 
which would result from the sale of them, without infringing any 
rule of justice that occurs to me, or their own laws .... 164 
Webster also seemed worried about windfalls: the existence of, for 
example, a gold mine unknown to either the United States as seller or to 
161. Streams of water with high salt content, saltlicks were a valuable resource for farmers 
raising animals. 
162. PELATIAH WEBSTER, POLffiCAL EsSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF MONEY, 
PuBLIC FINANCES, AND OTHER SUBJECTS 497-98 (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank I 791). 
163. Such breaches of faith by local officials were common. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY 
OF PuBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 705 (1968); MALcOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE 
BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PuBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837, 
at 32-34, 197-99 (1968). 
164. Letter from George Washington to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 14, 1784), in 28 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 9, 11 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938). 
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buyers. The parties could have dealt with such contingencies by increasing 
the price paid for land to reflect the likelihood of finding unexpected 
wealth, but this would have been quite difficult. Estimating the odds of a 
mine on government land, and its value, would involve great uncertainty. 
Moreover, this approach seems unattractive to buyers interested in farming. 
Assuming, as usual, that they are risk-averse, farmers buying farmland 
would find even fairly priced "tickets" to play in a "mining lottery" 
unattractive. The government thus would expect to find higher bidders 
elsewhere, and one might expect to see it separate mineral rights from other 
land rights. 
In the first statutes governing land sales, the national government 
pursued precisely such an approach. In 1785, the Continental Congress 
reserved for the government "one-third part of all gold, silver, lead and 
copper mines, to be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall 
hereafter direct." 165 Congress did not invent this measure. Under the 
common law of England, the Crown owned all gold and silver, and royal 
land grants in the colonies continued this tradition in one form or another.166 
When locating minerals was largely serendipitous, as opposed to the result 
of the significant investments utilized in modern times, letting mineral 
wealth essentially fall into the lap of the purchaser of well-situated farm 
acreage did amount to a windfall. 
The King, and later the United States, may have ceded a portion of 
mine output to landowners in order to induce them to search for valuable 
minerals and to reduce the incentive to keep such fmds secret. The young 
nation, however, simply lacked the resources to monitor effectively the acts 
of thousands of landowners on the frontier and thus never could enforce the 
rights it tried to reserve. Disloyal agents bought up the tracts themselves 
rather than disclose the location of mines to the government. Squatters 
mined parcels until ejected by bona fide purchasers. Mter a series of 
attempts to enforce the nation's rights over mineral wealth on lands, 
Congress by 1846 largely gave up on its efforts to reserve a portion of 
mineral windfalls for the nation.167 
165. 10 JOURNALS OFTiiECONTINENTALCONGRESS 378 (May 20, 1785). 
166. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF TiiE INSTITUTES OF TiiE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *577-78 (DavidS. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thome eds., Garland Publ'g 1979) (1642) 
(explaining the King's claim based on the necessity of precious metals for coinage). Early grants 
in Massachusetts colonies reserved to the Crown one-fifth of all gold and silver discovered. See 
James Warren Springer, American Indians and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New 
England, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HlST. 25, 32 (1986) (citing 1 RECORDS OF TiiE GOVERNOR AND 
COMPANY OF TiiE MASSACHUSETIS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 4, 9 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 
Boston, William White 1853-1854)). Other grants hewed to English tradition and reserved all gold 
and silver for the King. See ALBERT TANGEMAN VOLWll.ER, GEORGE CROGHAN AND TilE 
WESTWARD MOVEMENT 1741-82, at 251 (1926) (discussing a 1769 grant in New York State to 
George Croghan). 
167. See GATES, supra note 163, at 700-07. 
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2. Taxing Away Windfalls 
The government had extremely limited means to capture windfalls 
during the nation's first century. The rapid growth of the modem 
bureaucratic state in the late 1800s and early 1900s, however, changed the 
administrative landscape. Perhaps no mechanism played a greater role in 
this growth, and the concomitant ability to capture windfalls, than the 
establishment of a federal income tax. 168 With statutes, regulations, 
personnel, and all the other implements of a modem revenue-collection 
system in place, the United States by 1917 had the ability to tax perceived 
windfalls directly. 
The Subsections that follow first contrast the two major extraordinary 
profits taxes imposed by the federal government since it has had the ability 
to impose such levies: the excess profits taxes imposed during the two 
world wars and the windfall profits tax imposed on oil producers in the 
wake of OPEC's successful price hikes in the 1970s. The subsequent 
Subsections then argue that progressive taxation, and the doctrine of 
escheat, are forms of windfall capture. 
a. Excess and Windfall Profits Taxation 
1. Excess Profits Taxes During the World Wars 
Nobel Prize-winning economist John Hicks outlined two very different 
ways for a nation to levy taxes on exceptional wartime profits: 
A war profits tax is a tax on windfall profits; since there is very 
little reason in equity for claiming that anyone has the right to such 
profits in war-time, the special taxation of these profits can give 
little justifiable cause for complaint. But as soon as any element of 
the high profits principle is included, the tax becomes ... a general 
fi 169 pro ts tax .... 
168. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, established the validity 
of a federal tax on income. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Soon thereafter, a leading account 
discussing the nation's ability to raise money for the war effort noted that "[w]e appreciate more 
than ever before the great advantage of having developed the administrative machinery of !he 
income tax." T.S. Adams, Federal Taxes upon Income and Excess Profits, 8 AM. EcON. REV. 18, 
40 (Supp. 1918) (quoting the comments of ArlhurN. Young); see also ROBERTM. LAFOLLEITE, 
WAR PROFITS TAX: IS IT DISLOYAL TO ADVOCATE TilE TAXATION OF WAR PROFITS AND 
SURPLUS INCOMES? 3-32 (1917) (containing speeches before !he Senate on Sept. 1, 1917 and 
Sept. 10, 1917). 
169. JOHNR. HICKSET AL., THETAXATIONOFWAR WEALTII42 (1942) (emphases added). 
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Hicks uses the term "war profits" to describe a carefully targeted windfall 
profits tax (WPT), in contrast with a general tax on "high" profits whether 
or not they arise due to wartime spending-an excess profits tax (EPT). 
Both Britain and the United States assessed EPTs, not WPTs, during 
the world wars. These choices may have some historical roots, 170 but they 
appear to have been largely a product of expediency. As argued in this 
Subsection, it is very difficult to construct a WPT narrowly targeting only 
war profits. Unfortunately, EPTs are not good substitutes for WPTs. The 
EPTs implemented during the world wars warped incentives and thus 
created inefficiencies. 
Though largely forgotten, EPTs funded a large portion of the United 
States' expenditures during both world wars.171 The tax was part and parcel 
of the decision, often implicit, to leave most of the wartime economy in 
private hands, on the belief that, during war as during peace, the market 
would produce goods more efficiently than the state: "The case for some 
utilization of economic incentive in war-time is ... based upon the practical 
impossibility of bringing the whole of a nation's economic activities under 
control-or at least under effective control." 172 
Enterprises and their owners possessing goods and services in high 
demand inevitably accrue war wealth. 173 Cases of spectacular profits 
became public knowledge and caused outrage from the beginning of World 
War I. One of the first and most infamous cases in Britain was a 400% 
increase in the profits of Spillers & Bakers, a grain-trading firm, between 
1913 and 1914. The firm apparently locked in low prewar prices for large 
amounts of imported flour and sold at war-inflated prices.174 The American 
experience was similar though more extreme. Doubling of profits was 
170. During the Civil War, the Confederate State of Georgia enacted a business profits tax, 
with an exemption based on capital, that was similar in many ways to the world war EPTs. See 
KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, INCOI\ffi TAXATION: METHODS AND REsULTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
212-14 (1910). Michigan classified railroads according to net earnings per mile and assessed an 
EPT -like tax with rates depending on this measure. See HENRY CARTER ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF 
FINANCE 466 (New York, Holt & Co. 1898) .. 
171. During World War I, "[fjinancially, the excess profits tax was a huge success. It formed 
the backbone of our war tax system •.•. " KENNETH JAMES CURRAN, ExCESS PROFITS 
TAXATION 189 (1943). By the end of the war, it accounted for 59% of the American 
government's revenue. See id. at 136-37 & tbl.3. At its peak, the British EPT raised about 36% of 
the government's revenue. See JOSIAH STAMP, TAXATION DURING TilE WAR 249 app.IV (1932). 
During World War II, the EPT at its peak raised about 23% of federal government revenue. See 
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNuAL REPORT OF TilE SECRETARY OF TilE TREASURY ON TilE STATE 
OF TilE FINANCES 562-63 (1945) (noting that the EPT raised $5 billion out of a total revenue of 
$22 billion in the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1944). 
172. HICKSET AL., supra note 169, at4. 
173. "The only effective way of preventing war wealth from arising is to rely upon the 
compulsory method of mobilization rather than the voluntary method .... " ld. at 2. 
174. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 39-40; see also id. at42 (stating that profits of the King's 
Norton Metal Company rose 350% from 1913 to 1914). 
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common, while a few firms experienced increases of a factor of ten or even 
close to fifty .175 
Sweden and Denmark imposed the first special profits tax during World 
War I, in reaction to the spectacular profits of traders and shippers who, due 
to the allied blockade of the North Sea, possessed the sole remaining trade 
routes into Germany, through the Baltic Sea.176 Once enacted, the EPT, 
"[l]ike the Spanish influenza ... speedily infected all the belligerent 
countries on both sides .... " 177 Britain and the United States first enacted 
narrowly focused taxes on munitions makers, but they soon passed laws 
assessing an EPT on all corporations.178 
Many leaders and economists believed that the EPT should survive the 
war as an important source of public revenue.179 Opponents of the EPT, 
however, succeeded in repealing the tax after the war's end and prevented 
reenactment until World War II.180 History repeated itself in the early years 
of World War II, however, as both the United States and Britain first 
enacted special taxes on munitions makers181 and followed with economy-
wide EPTs.182 Most recently, the United States relied on an EPT during the 
Korean War.183 
Ordinary profit (that is, business income) taxes apply to all net income. 
An EPT applies only to "excess" profits, but there is no obvious way to 
defme excess profits. While statutes varied significantly in detail, all 
defined excess profits in one of two basic ways. Some provisions defined 
175. The profits of the American Agricultural Chemical Company and Standard Oil of New 
York doubled between 1913 and 1916. DuPont's profits increased 14-fold over the same period, 
while the American Zinc, Lead, and Smelting Company saw profits rise by a factor of 45. See LA 
FOLLETIE, supra note 168,, at 27. 
176. See PAOLO E. COLETTA, SEA POWER IN THE ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN IN 
WORLD WAR I, at 25-28, 29 map (1989). 
177. Carl C. Plehn, War Profits and Excess Profits Taxes, 10 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 285 
(1920) 
178. See CURRAN, supra note 171, at 8. The United States passed the Vinson-Trammel 
excess profits tax on munitions manufacturers as Title ill of the Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 
64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 780-82 (1916). In the ensuing years of World War I, Congress passed a 
succession of more broadly based and more complex EPTs. See Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 
64-377, tit. II, 39 Stat. 1000, 1000-02; War Expense Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, tit. II, 40 Stat. 300, 
302-08 (1917); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, tit. II, 40 Stat. 1057, 1088-96 (1919). 
179. In 1919, President Wilson advocated a permanent EPT as a way to "reach undue profits 
without discouraging the enterprise and activity of our business men." 58 CONG. REc. 41-42 
(1919). 
180. President Roosevelt's New Deal included a very modest EPT in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 216-17,48 Stat. 195,208-09 (1933). This measure, however, 
was designed not to raise revenue, but rather to encourage businesses to assess fairly their capital 
stock for a complementary tax on capital stock. See id. § 215, at 207-08. 
181. The (second) Vinson-Trammel Act taxed naval contractors 100% of profits in excess of 
the contract price. See Act of March 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-135, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 503,505. 
182. The United States enacted an EPT during initial mobilization, before it had entered the 
war. See Second Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-801, tit. II, 54 Stat. 974, 975-98. 
183. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
137-44 (1985). 
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any return on capital over a fixed percent as excess profits.184 This is clearly 
an economy-wide EPT that makes no attempt to target war windfalls. Other 
provisions defined excess profits as net income in excess of prewar 
levels.185 Most American and British EPTs gave firms the choice of using 
either method to determine the EPT they owed.186 
In the view of some politicians, identifying extraordinary war profits 
was easy, and taxing them had no adverse impact on effort or enterprise. 
" [P]recisely because the war profits which it is proposed to reach by 
taxation ... are abnormal profits, ansmg from abnormal causes, 
substantially all of them might be taken by the Government in taxation 
without disturbing normal business conditions, providing only that all kinds 
of business producing war profits are treated the same." 187 A prominent 
economist went even further, justifying an EPT even during peacetime. 
" [The EPT] represents, as it were, the share of the state in the 
'supernormal' success of every business enterprise. It measures roughly the 
value of the facilities, opportunities, and environment provided by the 
community .... [T]he state and community stand as silent partners in every 
business enterprise." 188 
Most experts at the time, however, realized that defining a normal level 
of profit for one firm, let alone for an entire economy, was difficult if not 
impossible.189 One serious problem was accounting for the varying riskiness 
of enterprises. A foundational principle of modem finance theory, 
undoubtedly known intuitively since the dawn of capitalism, is that those 
184. America's first World War I EPT, Title ll of the Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-
377, 39 Stat. 1000, 1000-02 (1917), taxed profits above eight percent of invested capital, plus 
$5000, at an eight-percent rate. 
185. Title II of the War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300, 302-08 (1917), added 
an alternative definition of excess profits: those exceeding average profits in the three years 
preceding the war. 
186. By the end of World War I, both Britain and the United States offered taxpaying firms 
such a choice. See session laws cited supra note 178; Plehn, supra note 177, at 287. Both nations 
offered the same choice throughout World War II. Congress enacted the first World War ll EPT in 
1940. See Second Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-801, tit. ll, 54 Stat. 974, 975-98 (1940). 
Both definitions survived equal protection challenges despite disparate impacts resulting from 
prewar profit fluctuations, varying definitions of invested capital across industries, and other 
sources of seeming unfairness in application. See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 
377 (1921). 
187. LA FOLLETIE, supra note 168, at 16-17. For similar optimism about separating war 
profit windfalls from fairly earned profits, see 54 CONG. REc. 2319 (statement of Rep. Dickinson) 
(1917) (" [T]hose who reap large war profits in times of distress should help to bear the burdens of 
Government, increased by reason of the very conditions that add to the wealth of those who 
flourish and fatten on the misfortunes of the country."). 
188. Adams, supra note 168, at 19-20 (1918). Commentators continue to define windfall 
profits as equivalent to excess profits. See HAROLD S. SLOAN & ARNOLD J. ZURCHER, 
DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 467 (5th ed. 1970) (defining a windfall profit as "[a] profit in excess 
of that which can be considered normal"). 
189. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 41 (arguing that "the difficulty in determining what were 
war profits [is] fundamental"); Plehn, supra note 177, at 285 (" [T]he line of demarcation between 
'war profits' and other unusual profits proved exceedingly hard to draw."). 
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taking greater risks demand greater rewards.190 Economists realized that 
defining excess profits as returns above a given percentage for all 
businesses was inappropriate. "The burden must not apply with full rigor to 
profits won at great hazard. Some crocks of cream appear to be richer than 
they are." 191 One early advocate of the EPT admitted that failure to account 
for varying risk was a fundamental flaw. 
Everyone recognizes that the same rate of return which would be 
fair to banks would be unfair to the men who make a business of 
prospecting or 'wild-catting' for minerals and oil .... 
. . . The percentage deduction should vary with the risk .... 
. . . The excess profits tax has grievously sinned in overtaxing 
profits derived from the more hazardous and difficult industrial 
undertakings. 192 
This shortcoming led some to advocate the use of past profits to define a 
baseline for excess wartime profits. 193 But using history to define "normal" 
profits involves a host of difficulties as well. Many businesses became 
especially risky during wartime and hence deserved higher profits.194 Since 
profits vary significantly from year to year, using a historical base for the 
EPTs made taxes vary arbitrarily from firm to flrm. 195 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty was making exceptions for fums 
designed to serve wartime needs. British policymakers realized that they 
had to make an exception for businesses that "had been carried on 
continuously for a great many years in peace time, not with the expectation 
or the hope, but on the possibility that one day in war time they might 
recoup themselves for their loss." 196 This amounts to an implicit admission 
that it was a mistake to assess EPTs against munitions manufacturers-
always the first target. 197 For businesses whose planning even in part 
reflected the possibility of war, high wartime profits are no windfall. 
Nations leaving the means of production in private hands want some firms 
to maintain capacity for wartime needs-and must be willing to reward 
such firms when the nation needs their output. 
190. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 129-212 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining in detail the theory and evidence 
showing that returns are positively correlated with risk). 
191. Robert Murray Haig, British Experience with Excess Profits Taxation, 10 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 12 (1920). 
192. Thomas S. Adams, Should the Excess Profits Tax Be Repealed?, 35 Q.J. EcON. 363, 
380, 390, 392 (1921). 
193. See, e.g., OTTO H. KAHN, SOME COMMENTS ON WAR TAXATION 24 (1917). 
194. See STAMP, supra note 171, at 182. 
195. See Adams, supra note 192, at 388-89. 
196. STAMP, supra note 171, at48-49. 
197. See supra text accompanying note 178. 
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So far I have examined only the tax base of the wartime EPTs. The 
marginal rate applied to the various bases varied considerably, rising as 
high as ninety percent.198 Commentators derided the waste that inevitably 
resulted from such high rates.199 The perverse economic incentives were 
simple. "When the government took [eighty-six percent] of an excess 
profit ... the tendency was to buy any article selling for £100 which had a 
value to the taxpayer of £14 or more." 200 The tactics employed were diverse 
and clever: charging low prices to earn customer goodwill, making 
"[r]enovations and repairs ... on a lavish scale," advertising with 
previously unseen intensity, hiring family members for nonexistent jobs, 
and paying inordinate salaries.201 A prominent financier noted, long before 
the development of the Laffer Curve, that high tax rates can lead to such 
severe avoidance that a shrinking tax base more than offsets the higher rate 
and leads to reduced government tax receipts.202 
Whatever base and rate lawmakers adopted, the bottom-line economic 
question was the effect of a tax on incentives to work hard and take 
calculated risks. 
If the offer of higher incomes to certain people does succeed in 
stimulating war production in those directions where it is most 
needed, then the nation which secures this stimulus in return for a 
draft on the future may have made a very good bargain. Higher 
incomes which do not result in any such stimulus are, however, 
likely to occur ... [and] their occurrence is one of the main 
198. While under Title II of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,56 Stat 798,899-
936, the marginal tax rate on excess profits was 90%, a separate provision limited an enterprise's 
total tax to 80% of net income. The 1934 Vinson-Trammel Act taxed 100% of naval contractor 
profits. See supra note 181. Such a high tax rate "is beyond all question very dangerous indeed," 
HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 44, as the nation soon realized." As the [American] rearmament 
program progressed, there developed throughout the country a belief that the severe restrictions 
placed upon profits by the Vinson-Trammel Act were retarding plant expansion and production in 
the defense industries." CURRAN, supra note 171, at 172. Congress repealed the Act when it 
imposed the general wartime EPT in 1940. 
199. See Haig, supra note 191, at 6 ("There was much evidence that the war tax ... had led 
to extravagant and wasteful expenditure ... . ");see also CURRAN, supra note 171, at 5 (noting 
"[t]he tendency of an excess profits tax to lead to wasteful expenditures and lax methods in 
industry"). 
200. Haig, supra note 191, at 9. 
201. ld. at 7-9. 
202. See KAHN, supra note 193, at 20. Kahn himself took no credit for this relationship, 
which economist Arthur Laffer rediscovered to much fanfare in the late 1970s. See Arthur B. 
Laffer, Statement Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee (May 20, 1977), reprinted in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TIIE TAX REVOLT: A READER 75-79 (Arthur B. Laffer & Jan P. Seymour eds., 
1979). Kahn regarded the insight as ancient: "It is one of the oldest principles of taxation that an 
excessive impost destroys its own productivity." ld. at 21. 
For a comprehensive analysis and historical summary of the idea behind the Laffer Curve, 
tracing it back at least to ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), see Don Fullerton, On 
the Possibility of an Inverse Relationship Between Tax Rates and Government Revenue, 19 J. 
PUB. EcON. 3 (1982). . 
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objections against the use of supply and demand as a means for the 
mobilization of resources in wartime.203 
To take concrete examples, munitions experts undoubtedly were 
awarded extraordinary income during World Wars I and II in order to 
induce them to work hard and to lure additional bright minds into the field. 
On the other hand, the owner of an existing oil field might reap pure rents 
due to intense wartime demand. This Article defines such rents as a 
windfall. Hicks concurred, noting that such rents comprised "the only part 
of the war debt ... which does correspond to a genuinely reprehensible 
form of war wealth." 204 While taxes on munitions experts were "dangerous 
expedients so far as they checked the economic incentive to efficiency," 
taxes on those reaping economic rents were "useful expedients [insofar as] 
they succeed[ed] in reducing the cost of obtaining [efficient wartime 
production], and in distributing the economic burden of war in a more 
equitable manner." 205 
EPTs taxed marginal profits, the last incremental dollars earned, and 
hence seriously undermined incentives for effort and enterprise that would 
increase the amount of war material produced.206 Even advocates admitted 
that the tax seemed "calculated to depress industry, to check enterprise at 
its very inception." 207 Legislators and administrators soon became aware 
that the EPT undermined the very incentives that justified leaving war 
production in private hands and added a wide variety of measures to reward 
new investment.208 These attempts to mitigate the disincentives inherent in 
EPTs led to the extraordinary complexity emphasized by virtually every 
commentator.209 
203. HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 23. 
204. ld. at 23-24. 
205. I d. at 8. While there was significant worry about the outbreak of war, the actual outbreak 
of hostilities in the fall of 1914 was still surprising, and thus it is far from clear that the likelihood 
of war was capitalized into asset prices. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A 
COMPLETE HISTORY 11, 13 (1994) (" [W]ar seemed unlikely in the spring and summer of 
1914 .... [T]he fact that almost every European Head of State was related by marriage to every 
other ... created bonds that seemed unbreakable."). 
206. See HICKS ET AL., supra note 169, at 43. 
207. Adams, supra note 168, at 45 (quoting Edwin R.A. Seligman). 
208. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-259, § 203, 55 Stat. 687, 702 (containing 
special tax provisions for new plants useful only during wartime); CURRAN, supra note 171, at 
181-82 (encouraging increased production by allowing new plant expenditures to count 125% in 
defining invested capital); Plehn, supra note 177, at 287,292 (describing administrative measures 
varying tax rates to address differences in risk across enterprises). 
209. See, e.g., CURRAN, supra note 171, at 178 (stating that the EPT "proved next to 
impossible for any one other than the tax expert to understand"); Adams, supra note 192, at 369 
(describing enormous "resentment at [the EPT's] intricacy"). The Secretary of the Treasury 
himself complained about the complexity of the EPT in an annual report after the war. See 1920 
DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY ANN. REP. 30. Though similar perceptions are common today, 
taxpayers in the nascent days of the income tax found it preposterous that officials and experts 
often disagreed about key aspects of the EPT. See Adams, supra note 168, at 46. 
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It is instructive to contrast the imposition of the EPT on industry with 
the complete absence of any special tax on farmers. Policymakers quite 
properly noted that "it was illogical to be urging [farmers] in every way to 
put more land under cultivation and increase the food-supply, and at the 
same time render them liable to special taxation if they did so." 210 The 
obvious question, then, is why the same logic did not apply to industry. 
It is clear that the wartime EPTs were inimical to incentives for extra 
effort and enterprise. In theory, however, it is possible to construct a tax 
that "aims at windfalls, the fruits of chance and luck, monopoly gains, war 
profits and the like." 211 The key insight is to realize that many (though by 
no means all) owners of capital and resources existing at the onset of 
hostilities did indeed reap a windfall when wartime demand surprisingly 
made their holdings more valuable. These rents were windfalls, "the fruits 
of chance and luck, monopoly gains," and taxing them is efficient both as a 
source of revenue and as a means of risk-spreading (again, as long as 
transaction and administrative costs are not prohibitive). Special wartime 
taxes should not apply, however, to investments in plants and discoveries of 
resources made in anticipation of war or made after war begins. Thus, 
farmers should have been assessed special taxes on acreage planted at the 
onset of a war, but not on additional acres brought under cultivation. Such a 
tax structure would not interfere with incentives to produce more; it would 
merely tax windfall profits to existing levels of enterprise. Separating pre-
and postwar investments and discoveries, however, would have been an 
administrative nightmare. 
There may have been important sociological and political reasons for 
EPT taxation during wartime. "The excess profits tax has been pointed to 
as an assurance that there would be no profiteering in urging all groups in 
the economy to cooperate in the prosecution of the war." 212 With an entire 
generation of men heading off to the front lines, "the public was in no 
mood to tolerate a situation that promised extravagant profits to industry at 
a time when selective service was imposing severe sacrifices upon hundreds 
of thousands." 213 There was a widespread perception that the public simply 
would not tolerate enormous profits while so many were sacrificing their 
lives; in Britain, " '[t]he indignation of the country was brought to boiling-
point"' by reports of extraordinary profits of firms like Spillers & 
Bakers.214 President Roosevelt was so sensitive to this public concern that in 
210. STAMP, supra note 171, at 71. 
211. Adams, supra note 192, at 367. 
212. MAR.IONHAMILTONGILLIM, THEINCIDENCEOFEXCESSPROFITSTAXATION 55 (1945). 
213. CURRAN, supra note 171, at 175. 
214. STAMP, supra note 171, at 40. For a discussion of Spillers & Bakers's extraordinary 
profits, see supra text accompanying note 174. Conspicuous consumption led to extremely high 
personal income tax rates during the war. The British press bemoaned " 'the Asquith wedding of 
1915, which was so awkward a stumbling block in the way of preachers of economy for many 
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his first radio address after the outbreak ofWWII, long before Pearl Harbor, 
he declared that " 'no American has the moral right to profiteer at the 
expense either of his fellow-citizens or of the men, women, and children 
who are living and dying in the midst of war in Europe,"' 215 and he later 
swore that "not a single war millionaire would be permitted as a result of 
the war disaster." 216 The EPfs may have played an important role in 
obtaining organized labor's cooperation in working overtime to produce as 
much as possible for the war effort. "It was stated that [an excess profits] 
tax would be a most important factor in mollifying labour, for one of the 
greatest causes of unfortunate trade disputes was the feeling of the men that 
their masters were filling their pockets." 217 "'A profits tax would do more 
to increase production than anything else could do.'" 218 
While public policy usually does not concern itself with mollifying 
envy, and standard economics does not model the effect of A's wealth on 
B' s happiness,219 the world wars involved mass conscription, rationing, and 
other extreme measures. Thus, politicians may have calculated rationally 
that EPfs were necessary to hold together the social fabric. High 
transaction and administrative costs may have made a theoretically more 
attractive windfall profits tax infeasible. There may have been no choice 
consistent "with both good morals and good economics, to prevent, as far 
as possible, the enrichment of business and business men through the 
calamity of war." 220 Thus, the EPfs may have been defensible as the best 
alternative in an imperfect world. 
ii. The Windfall Profit Tax on Oil 
The Windfall Profit Tax on Oil, in contrast to the wartime EPfs, stands 
as a relatively efficient tax on unearned windfalls. While ultimately caused 
by the successful 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), the roots of the tax begin with economy-wide 
months afterward,"' and similarly railed against a ball given by Lady Curzon in 1917 that was 
"'beautifully done and extremely smart."' LA FOLLETTE, supra note 168, at 19 (citing The Loan 
and the Moral, EcONOMIST, Mar. 3, 1917, at424). 
215. CURRAN, supra note 171, at 174 (quoting Text of Address by the President, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Sept. 4, 1939, at 6). 
216. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATIONINTHEUNITEDSTATES 263 (1954). 
217. STAMP, supra note 171, at 51. 
218. /d. at 147 (quoting Sir A. Markham, M.P.); see also Note, Mobilization for Defense, 54 
HARV. L. REv. 278, 311 (1940) (stating that Congress passed the EPT on the eve of WWll in 
large part to protect the morale of laborers, consumers, and draftees from high wartime profits by 
industry). 
219. For a comprehensive overview of the limited economic literature examining models in 
which people's welfare depends on the welfare of others, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative 
Preferences, 102 YALEL.J. 1 (1992). 
220. KAHN, supra note 193, at 22. 
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wage and price controls imposed by executive order in 1971.221 While most 
controls soon ended, the government continued to regulate oil prices in the 
wake of OPEC's successful cartelization in 1973 and thereafter. For th~ 
duration of the 1970s, domestic petroleum prices remained below world 
levels by governmental fiat.222 
Artificially low domestic petroleum prices only exacerbated the energy 
cns1s by encouraging consumption and discouraging domestic 
exploration.223 These adverse incentives created a growing chorus for price 
deregulation, and the government eventually responded. 
In 1979, President Carter announced a program to remove price 
controls from domestic oil by ... 1981. By eliminating price 
controls, the President sought to encourage exploration for new oil 
and to increase production of old oil from marginally economic 
operations. He recognized, however, that deregulating oil prices 
would produce substantial gains (referred to as "windfalls") for 
some producers. The price of oil on the world market had risen 
markedly, and it was anticipated that deregulating the price of oil 
already in production would allow domestic producers to receive 
prices far in excess of their initial estimates. Accordingly, the 
221. See Dennis B. Drapkin & Philip K. Verleger, Jr., The Windfall Profit Tax: Origins, 
Development, Implications, 22 B.C. L. REV. 631, 639 (1981). 
222. For a more detailed history of the Wmdfall Profit Tax on Oil, see id. The lynchpin 
regulatory measure to deal with the huge disparity between domestic and world market oil prices 
created by the price freeze on petroleum was the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756 (repealed 1975). This Act "established a mechanism for allocating the 
benefits of lower-cost price-controlled crude oil equitably throughout the country-not by 
physically allocating oil, but by a system of cash transfers among the refiners based upon their 
relative access to such oil." Texaco v. Department of Energy, 795 F.2d 1021, 1023 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App. 1986). For a summary and analysis of the Act, see Note, National Energy Goals and 
FEA 's Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program, 61 VA. L. REV. 903 (1975). 
223. Price controls are one way to capture windfalls-indeed, they are more precise than 
general taxation in redistributing gains from lucky winners to losers. As experience with oil price 
controls showed, however, the misallocative effects of price controls are significant 
To highlight these misallocations, consider another context giving rise to frequent 
complaints of \vindfalls: hardware stores charging high prices for everything from flashlights to 
shovels in the wake of a natural disaster such as a hurricane. If the store owner cannot raise prices 
in the short run (before additional supplies can arrive), then someone may wander in and buy the 
last flashlight to use as a nightlight for a mildly scared child, while the next person to rush in may 
need one to search for survivors in a collapsed building. A higher price signals less needy users to 
forgo consumption in favor of those in greater need. Contrary to popular belief, then, raising 
prices in the wake of a disaster is not price-gouging-indeed, it may save lives. In the long run, of 
course, we rely on higher prices to encourage greater production of flashlights (eventually driving 
price back down to cost). If the natural disaster were truly an unprecedented surprise, and if it 
were administratively feasible, the state might enact a windfall profits tax on hardware stores after 
the fact Price regulation, however, is a foolhardy substitute. 
These observations apply with equal force to one popular form of price regulation: rent 
control. While temporary, surprise housing shortages make the strongest economic case for 
barring landlords from raising rents, see ANTIIONY DOWNS, REsiDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS: AN 
EVALUATION 1-2 (1988), such regulations mean, for example, that some fantilies will retain 
excessive space, while others in great need may have to look far afield. 
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President proposed that Congress place an excise tax on the 
additional revenue resulting from decontrol.224 
The Court properly labeled the measure an excise (sales) tax; in spite of its 
title, the Act did not (at least directly) tax profits.225 The Windfall Profit Tax 
on Oil (WPTO) taxed producers on a percentage of the difference between 
the market price of each barrel they sold and some base price defined in the 
statute. This avoided the difficulty of defining the "normal" profits of oil 
producers, a problem that, as outlined above, plagued the wartime EPTs.226 
The definition of base prices and the varying percentage tax rates were 
designed to create incentives for producers to explore for new domestic 
sources of oil. Generally speaking, oil from older wells (those predating the 
OPEC embargo) had both a lower base price (and so a greater portion of the 
price was taxable) and higher tax rate (up to seventy percent). The statute 
also contained a variety ·of complicated exceptions and exemptions for oil 
that was expensive to find and extract. 
The Act was explicitly "designed to impose relatively high tax rates 
where production cannot be expected to respond very much to further 
increases in price and relatively low tax rates on oil whose production is 
likely to be responsive to price." 227 The Act, then, aimed to tax most 
heavily oil stocks discovered before the surprising OPEC embargo, while 
taxing more recent and future discoveries less heavily or not at all. This is 
precisely analogous to the efficient (though perhaps infeasible) alternative 
to the wartime EPTs discussed earlier.228 The WPTO targeted windfalls 
accruing to those lucky enough to be sitting on large stocks of oil when 
OPEC surprised everyone by raising the world market price of oil 
dramatically during the 1970s.229 As discussed in Part II, the windfall gains 
of domestic producers charging OPEC-inflated prices were both an efficient 
224. United States v. Ptasynski,, 462 U.S. 74, 76 (1983) (holding that the Crude Oil Windfall 
Profit Tax Act of 1980 did not violate the Constitution's Uniformity Clause, see U.S. CONST., art. 
I, § 8, cl. I) (internal citations omitted). 
225. See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229-308. 
To the extent that the incidence of the tax fell on producers (that is, insofar as they could not shift 
the tax onto their customers), as primarily appears to have been the case, the tax ultimately did 
reduce profits instead of raising prices. 
226. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text. 
227. H.R. REP. No. 96-304, at 7 (1979), cited in Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 77; see also S. REP. 
No. 96-394, at 6 (1979). "It is easy to see why a windfall profits tax on oil, for example, might be 
best applied to oil already extracted, with future oil exempted." Levmore, supra note 12, at 273 
n.l6. 
228. See supra text accompanying note 211. 
229. An external cartel benefits domestic producers in ways similar to a tariff: A cartel 
maintains an artificially high price worldwide, while a tariff maintains an artificially high price 
domestically. Economists have long argued that industries benefiting from tariffs (if there must be 
tariffs) should pay some sort of windfall profits tax. See, e.g., CURRAN, supra note 171, at 3. 
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source of tax revenue and a desirable form of sharing risk with a population 
facing higher energy prices. 230 
On the plausible assumption that nobody foresaw that OPEC would try 
to limit worldwide oil production, let alone succeed,231 the WPTO taxed 
gains nobody expected. By limiting the levy to existing stocks, the 
government had no need to face the difficulty of adjusting the tax for the 
riskiness of the different enterprises. As windfalls, the gains of domestic 
producers due to OPEC's success were all risklessly obtained. 
Although the WPTO was free of many difficulties that faced the 
wartime EPTs, it was not perfect. Because base prices did not reflect real-
world costs precisely, experts estimate that the tax did discourage a modest 
amount of cost-effective domestic production.232 And while it seemed a less 
ambitious tax than the wartime EPTs, governing previously discovered oil 
rather than present and future production of, and investment in, virtually 
everything, one government study declared that the WPTO was "perhaps 
the largest and most complex tax ever levied on a U.S. industry." 233 
Estimates put the administrative costs of the WPTO at $115 million a 
year.234 
Despite these imperfections, in the main the WPTO performed 
admirably. Economists seem united in believing that, given a world price 
for (competing) oil that domestic producers could not affect, the producers 
230. It is important to note that, to the extent that all citizens own a diversified portfolio of 
stocks, they would to some extent share in many windfalls such as that experienced by oil 
producers in the wake of OPEC. What people lost at the gas pump, they would gain back in their 
mutual funds and pension plans. Diversified investing, however, is unlikely to make windfalls a 
wash. The windfall may occur in an industry largely in private hands, concentrating the gain in 
relatively few hands. This was the case with the oil industry in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
independents produced roughly half the nation's annual oil output. See William P. Streng & Mark 
W. Romefelt, Structure of the Windfall Profits Tax, in PRACTICING LAW INST., WINDFALL 
PROFITS TAX 11, 17-18 (William P. Streng ed., 1980). In addition, of course, wealth is not 
perfectly distributed. The wealthy own stocks disproportionate to their numbers; relying on 
individual portfolios to spread windfalls is thus regressive. 
231. The standard assumption in economics is that price-fixing cartels are unstable, since, in 
the absence of some enforcement mechanism, each supplier has an incentive to produce and sell 
more, reducing prices. See NICHOLSON, supra note 15, at 449. OPEC did eventually succumb to 
this "law" of economics, but only after a number of years, during which the cartel soaked billions 
of dollars from the U.S. economy. See Salvatore Lazzari, Should the Windfall Profits Tax Be 
Reinstated?, 48 TAX NOTES 1695 (1990). 
232. "Over its eight-year life span, the windfall profits tax reduced domestic oil production 
by between three and six percent, depending on the price elasticity of oil supply." Lazzari, supra 
note 231, at 1695. The main source of disincentives were base prices that discouraged additional 
development of existing oil fields. See Impact of Windfall Profits Tax Repeal on U.S. Production 
Outlined in DOE Study, PLATI'S OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 19, 1987, at 6. 
233. GAO, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980 
(1984), quoted in Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1695. 
234. It cost the federal government $15 million per year to administer the tax and cost private 
industry $100 million a year to comply. See Oil Producers Win in Windfall Profits Tax Repeal, 
UPI, Apr. 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Librruy, WIRES File. 
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were unable to shift the tax onto consumers.235 Hence, the WPTO hit its 
target. The windfall captured by the tax was huge-roughly $44 billion.236 
This was not the entire windfall, but it was close: " [T]he tax recouped 
about three-fourths of the windfalls that accrued to the U.S. oil industry." 237 
At the appropriate moment, the tax died a natural death. By 1986, OPEC's 
price-fixing regime began to fall apart. Market prices declined below the 
base prices of the WPTO and thus producers owed no taxes. Congress 
repealed the tax in 1988.238 Given the effectiveness of the WPTO, some 
politicians have called for its reinstatement if and when the OPEC cartel 
again effectively limits production and raises prices. When OPEC did just 
that in the summer of 1990, for instance, one congressman declared that 
" [ w ]indfall profits generated by ... price gouging at the expense of 
consumers are intolerable and should be taxed." 239 
The windfall justification for special taxation, however, only works 
once. The world oil markets did seem largely surprised by OPEC's 
successful cartelization in 1973. Few if any investment and exploration 
decisions contemplated skyrocketing oil prices. Since the first oil shock, 
however, OPEC has remained a fundamental source of risk in the oil 
market.240 Thus, while a successful OPEC may indeed boost the profits of 
domestic oil producers, "just as sure, the industry might suffer windfall 
losses when OPEC decides to help drive oil prices downwards, as happened 
in 1986." 241 OPEC is now part of the oil market landscape, and it is 
positively desirable that oil producers weigh the cartel's effects in their 
exploration and investment decisions. For instance, post-OPEC, it may well 
235. For a conventional static analysis showing that producers, not consumers, paid the 
WPTO, see Stephen L. McDonald, The Incidence and Effects of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit 
Tax, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 331, 336-39 (1981). There followed between McDonald and Dale 
Lehman a rather involved debate over the relative merits of this simple static model and a more 
complex dynamic exhaustible resource model of the oil market. See Dale E. Lehman, Reader 
Response, A Reexamination of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 683 
(1981); Stephen L. McDonald, Reader Response, The Incidence and Effects of the Crude Oil 
Windfall Profit Tax: A Reply to Lehman, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 690 (replying to Lehman); Dale 
E. Lehman, Reader Response, 22 NAT. REsOURCES J. 275 (1982) (offering a rejoinder to 
McDonald); Stephen L. McDonald, Reader Response, 22 NAT. REsOURCES J. 277 (1982) 
(providing a riposte to Lehman). 
236. The Congressional Research Service found that, over it!. lifetime, the tax raised 
$77.7 billion in gross revenue (roughly $126 billion in current dollars) but only $43.7 billion in 
net revenue (roughly $71.7 billion in current dollars), since producers could deduct WPTO 
payments on their regular income tax returns. See Oil Producers Win in Windfall Profits Tax 
Repeal, supra note 234. Current dollar calculations are based on the Consumer Price Index for All 
Consumer Goods, seasonally adjusted, U.S. average, for all items, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
series I.D. no. CUSROOOOSAO, available at http://www.bls.gov. 
237. Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1695. 
238. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1941, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1322-24. 
239. Silvio 0. Conte, ... Or Tax Excess Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1990, at A23. 
240. See Lazzari, supra note 231, at 1696. 
241. Id. 
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be rational for domestic producers to look for oil that would cost, for 
example, $75 a barrel to extract, even though the market price has never 
exceeded $40 a barrel, and has, for the most part, fluctuated between $10 
and $25 for the last decade.242 Such expensive oil might become attractive if 
a reinvigorated OPEC managed to drive the price of oil above $100 a 
barrel. Companies will not undertake such socially desirable exploration, 
however, if the government stands ready to tax away the profits that only 
foresight made possible. Windfall taxation makes sense only when gains 
are due to true surprises, and events are usually surprises only the first time 
market participants encounter them.243 
The lesson is that windfall taxation should be imposed judiciously, as 
true surprises are uncommon and by definition are not recurring events. 
Britain's Labour government apparently has yet to learn this lesson. It 
recently imposed a windfall profits tax on privatized utilities that made 
record profits after the previous Tory government sold them to investors.244 
Advocates did not point to a surprise that justified the tax; it seems that 
either the government charged too little for the utilities when it sold them,245 
or that regulators authorized excessive rate increases. The only surprise in 
this case was the decision to impose a tax, and even that has come back to 
haunt the government. When officials began the process of privatizing 
railways, before the imposition of the windfall tax on utilities, 
municipalities warned "that a windfall tax on water and electricity would 
undermine the prospects for future privatisations." 246 Bidders will reduce 
their offers to reflect (discounted) expected future windfall profits taxes.247 
The folly of the utility tax led some commentators to issue overly broad 
condemnations of all windfall taxation. For instance, the claim that, 
"[s]ince they are applied retrospectively, windfall taxes are inherently 
242 See WTI Crude Monthly Averages (visited March 1, 1999) <http://www.wen.co.za/ 
wen/charts/oillcomawt.htm>. 
243. In theory, a \vindfall tax on domestic oil discovered before 1973 but still in the ground 
would be sensible. After 25 years, a large portion of domestic reserves consists of later 
discoveries. As time goes on, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine which fields and what 
percent of each field were discovered before 1973. 
244. See Michael Prescott, Power Finns Face £2.5 Bn. Windfall Tax, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Sept 24, 1995 (discussing the political clamor for the tax); U.K. Utilities Hit by 
"Windfall" Taxation Plan, On.. & GAS J., July 14, 1997, at 27 (discussing enactment of the tax by 
the new Labour government). 
245. One official drew the following analogy: "If you sell a house and three years later you 
regret the price you sold you have no right to say you should change the terms of the contract." 
Peter Rodgers, City Antipathy Fuelled by Fear and Loathing, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept 
27, 1995, at 2 (quoting Adair Turner). 
246. Id. 
247. The government may fool them once, but investors are likely to catch on to patterns of 
governmental behavior that affect returns and capitalize them into prices. Thus, the government 
cannot rely on surprise as a long-term policy tool. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, 
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. EcON. 473 (1977); 
R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REv. EcON. STUD. 
165 (1955-1956). 
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unfair," 248 is untenable. As discussed in Part II, the government can put the 
world on notice that when it detects unearned rents, it will tax them. While 
it is generally true that, "if people come to believe that when they make 
money the state may arbitrarily snatch a large part of it, they will not work 
as hard," 249 windfalls by definition are not the fruits of effort or enterprise. 
Thus, ta'{ing them creates no disincentive effects.250 
b. Progressive Income Tax 
Windfall profit taxation need not focus on one product or industry. 
Comparing the celebrity status and huge incomes commanded by some 
Olympic gold medalists with the return to anonymity suffered by other 
world-class athletes, one commentator argues that luck often plays a 
significant role in personal income: " [W]hen it comes to income, skill and 
hard work seem to play only a moderate role." 251 While it seems unlikely 
that income earned by a minimum-wage manual laborer is due to any sort 
of windfall, Olympic athletes, business executives, and others earn much 
more than competitors with similar skills and dedication, and the difference 
may be due to luck. To the extent this is true, then "even from a standpoint 
of efficiency (much less equity), a progressive tax may not be so bad after 
all." 252 
The role of luck in personal income, however, is much less clear than 
the role of luck in specific events, such as OPEC's effect on the oil market. 
It is difficult to determine the effect of a steeply progressive tax on effort 
and enterprise, but the disincentives may be significant.253 And reward 
mechanisms that give rise to huge income discrepancies based on 
seemingly small differences in performance may be rational means to 
induce maximal effort from a pool of employees. The theory of 
tournaments suggests that corporations pay CEOs huge salaries to induce 
extraordinary effort from scores of senior vice presidents hoping to be the 
248. Britain: Chasing Windfalls: Taxation, EcONOMIST, June 14-20, 1997, at 61. 
249. Id. 
250. Despite its absolutist tone, the Economist editorial admits that banks earned "genuine 
windfalls" when the government tightened monetary policy in 1980 and thus they defend a 
windfall profits tax on those gains. See id. They distinguish this episode from the utilities tax by 
noting that "the circumstances appeared unusual" for the banks, but not for the utilities. /d. This 
simply may be another way of saying that the banks experienced higher profits due to a complete 
surprise (and hence received a windfall), while the utilities earned their higher profits by effort 
and enterprise (and hence, under this Article's definition of the term, did not receive a windfall). 
See id. 
251. Steuerle, supra note 11, at 1197. 
252. Id. at 1198. 
253. See Jerry A. Hausman, Labor Supply, in HOW TAXES AFFECT EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27 
(Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981); Jerry A. Hausman & James M. Poterba, 
Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 101 (1987). 
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next occupant of the top perch.254 Thus, efficiency considerations weigh 
both for and against progressive taxation: Such taxes undoubtedly capture 
some lucky windfalls, but also create disincentives and hence deadweight 
losses. More controversial fairness arguments may be necessary to tip the 
scale in favor of progressive taxation. 
c. Intestacy and Escheat 
One of the earliest uses of the term windfall was to describe receipts of 
inheritance, and commentators continue to so view the gains of 
beneficiaries under wills.255 While an inheritance is often (though not 
always) unearned, the proper focus of an efficiency analysis is on the 
granting decedent, not the grantees. People are under no obligation to die 
with assets; they can annuitize their net wealth at some advanced age and 
thus ensure they leave nothing at death. Yet most choose to leave estates 
large relative to their average incomes and to draft wills directing every 
detail of the distribution of all of this wealth upon their deaths. This 
behavior indicates that making gifts upon death has great utility to most 
people. Taxing away bequests would cause devisers to alter their behavior 
and leave less wealth via wills. People might work less hard, which is often 
undesirable from a societal point of view. They would likely engage in 
other behavior generally thought undesirable, such as consuming instead of 
saving or making charitable donations. 
When there is no will-an instance of intestacy-there are fairly strong 
grounds to presume a certain indifference on the part of the deceased. Most 
states, however, do not expropriate the estate when blood relations survive 
the intestate decedent,256 presumably under the theory that almost everyone 
means to leave their worldly possessions to such relatives and the absence 
of a will is a mere oversight. Thus, the law, as it so often does, implies 
likely default provisions where a decedent neglects to make a will. 
If a decedent has no living relations, the government effectively taxes 
the estate at 100% under the doctrine of escheat. Taxing wealth that the 
owner basically abandoned at death creates little, if any, disincentive for the 
living-if they are working hard to provide someone with an inheritance, 
254. The seminal work on tournaments as compensation systems is Edward P. Lazear & 
Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcON. 841 
(1981). The seemingly inordinate rewards garnered by Olympic gold medalists compared to all 
other competitors may play the same role, motivating all contestants to practice harder and longer, 
and thereby producing a better competition in general. Steuerle seems to contemplate this 
possibility when he admits that "the potential of large rewards may compel some to work harder 
than ever." Steuerle, supra note 11, at 1197. 
255. See supra note 2 (citing use by Erasmus in Apophthegmes). For a similar modem-era 
characterization, see Plehn, supra note 177, at 283 ("Inheritance may be regarded as something 
unexpected and of the nature of a windfall .... " ). 
256. SeeWILLIAMM.MCGOVERN,JR.EfAL., WILLS, TRUSTSANDEsTATES 17-18(1988). 
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they know that they need only write a will. Thus, intestate estates form an 
attractive target for windfall taxation, and the modem law of escheat has a 
long pedigree. Adam Smith listed a series of intestacy taxes,257 and 
Bentham advocated a 100% tax in cases of intestacy where there were no 
close surviving relatives.258 Bentham's position foreshadowed a trend 
toward curtailing windfalls for distant "laughing heirs," who receive 
surprise inheritances from, for example, fifth cousins they never even knew 
existed. The Uniform Probate Code and a growing number of states look 
only as far as cousins (and their issue) when they distribute intestate 
estates. 259 
While this expansion of escheat seems efficient, other recent 
innovations of the doctrine are questionable. For instance, section 2(a)(1) of 
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act extends escheat to unredeemed 
travelers checks and a host of modem fmancial devices, such as unclaimed 
insurance proceeds, utility deposits, etc.260 At first blush, it might appear 
that unredeemed travelers checks are a windfall to issuers, but in a 
competitive market they will have to pass on this saving to purchasers. This 
market solution spreads the risk of forgetting about travelers checks over 
the subgroup of consumers who purchase travelers checks: Returning the 
windfall to those who create it, instead of the entire population, reduces 
costs, and thus encourages the use of travelers checks. This is analogous to 
returning lost goods to their true owners. 
3. Insider Trading 
In contrast to the time-honored use of escheat to capture hereditary 
windfalls, the laws against insider trading are a recent development.261 That 
insider trading was legal at common law is one factor cited to support 
arguments that the practice is efficient.262 Yet just as assessing a windfall 
profits tax would have been administratively impossible before nations 
257. See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO TilE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TilE WEALTI:I OF 
NATIONS 386-87 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago 1976) (1775-1776). 
258. See 1 JEREMY BENTI:IAM'S EcONOMIC WRITINGS 283 (W. Stark ed., 1952). 
259. See UNIF. PROBA1E CODE§ 2-103 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 1 (1998) (adopted in 14 
states). At least three other states that have not adopted the Code have nonetheless followed its 
lead and have limited the remoteness of relatives who take in cases of intestacy. See KAN. STAT. 
ANN.§ 59-509 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.§ 112.017 (1997); WASH REV. CODE ANN.§ 11.04.015 
(West 1998). 
260. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT § 2(a)(1) (amended 1995), 8B U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 
1998). 
261. The United States had no federal securities laws until Congress enacted the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78lll (1994). The Securities and Exchange Commission did not promulgate Rule 
lOb-5, the provision used to police insider trading, until1948. See 17 C.P.R. 240.10b-5 (1998). 
262. See Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Inve~tment Analysts: An Economic Analysis 
ofDirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127, 135 (1984). 
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possessed extensive revenue collection apparatus, so too regulating insider 
trading would have been extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, before 
the advent of extensive securities market regulation. Under the common 
view, insider trading can result in unearned windfalls, and hence regulation 
is clearly desirable.263 To the uninitiated, then, the assertion that insider 
trading is a desirable, efficient activity may seem fatuous. Yet serious 
scholarship offers two grounds for returning to the common-law rule 
allowing insider trading. 
The first contention is that insider trading is an efficient form of 
executive compensation.264 Executives may try to free ride on each others' 
efforts; to the extent that it is difficult to separate out individual 
contributions to a company's success, there may be insufficient incentives 
for effort and enterprise. One way to reward producers of n~w ideas is to 
permit insider trading: " [T]he manager can immediately 'renegotiate' his 
compensation package by purchasing shares .... [l]nsider trading is the 
only compensation scheme that allows immediate and costless renegotiation 
whenever managers believe that they have the opportunity to develop 
valuable information." 265 
Ross raises a powerful objection to insider trading as a form of 
executive compensation: Shareholders will have little, if any, control over 
the size of insider trading profits and thus the agents (instead of the 
principal) set their own wages. Thus, this form of compensation invites 
executives to appropriate large rents without monitoring by other corporate 
officials, shareholders, or the market.266 And the fact that shareholders and 
potential shareholders might have a rough idea of the level of insider 
trading and discount the price they are willing to pay for shares does not 
justify the practice: A known level of criminal embezzlement would have 
the same effect yet is clearly undesirable. 
In addition to citing the common-law rule permitting insider trading in 
support of the practice's efficiency, Fischel notes that during this period of 
legality firms did not enact charter provisions barring insider trading by 
263. This Subsection addresses the more difficult case of insider trading on positive 
information likely to increase share prices. Rules against insider trading on negative information 
are universally endorsed: Manufacturing bad news is much easier than manufacturing good news, 
and if corporate executives could make money by trading in advance of bad news, the perverse 
incentives would be overwhelming. 
264. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TilE STOCK MARKET 131-45 (1966); 
Fischel, supra note 262, at 132. This justification applies only to "classic" insider trading-
trading by executives in the shares of their employer. It cannot justify insider trading by, for 
example, printers, see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), or by lawyers representing 
an acquirer who trade in shares of the target, see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
265. Fischel, supra note 262, at 132. 
266. See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of 
Modem Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 184 
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). 
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their own executives.267 This he takes as further evidence of the efficiency 
of insider trading. By the same token, however, it is possible for firms today 
to simulate insider trading as a form of executive compensation. Employers 
could stand ready to write any and all call options requested by executives, 
giving them the right to buy however many shares desired, at some price 
above the stock's current market price, lasting for however long the 
executives think it will take for some new idea to translate into a higher 
stock price. If necessary, companies could avoid securities regulation of 
these transactions by making the mechanism entirely derivative: Option 
purchases could be made as mere accounting entries, and all settlements 
could be paid in cash instead of shares. If insider trading is indeed an 
efficient form of compensation, one would expect to observe such schemes 
often; yet I have uncovered not a single reference to such a contract in the 
extensive literature on executive compensation. 
The second argument used to defend insider trading is that it causes 
stock prices to reflect all available information, instead of just public 
information, and hence leads to more accurate and efficient pricing of 
shares?63 It is not at all clear, however, that personal trading by one or a few 
parties trying to remain anonymous will move the market. If everyone else 
in the market believes that the risk/reward profile of a company has not 
changed, then any temporary upward pressure on its share price should 
bring additional shares to market since the price now looks "too high" 
given public information about the company, which by assumption has not 
changed. 269 And even if insider trading does move the market, there is a 
simpler objection: It seems just as easy to move the market even faster by 
requiring full disclosure before insiders may trade?70 
Thus, it is doubtful that insider trading is beneficial, either as a form of 
executive compensation or as a method to factor all information into stock 
prices. The more difficult question is: In the vast, anonymous stock market, 
who is harmed by insider trading? As noted previously, to the extent market 
participants have a rough sense of the level of insider trading, they will 
discount the price they pay for shares. Thus, in general, insider trading does 
not affect returns, but it does make it more expensive for firms to raise 
equity capital. A few definite victims are identifiable. First, those who trade 
frequently without inside information will, over the run of transactions, 
267. See Fischel, supra note 262, at 135. 
268. See id. at 14042. 
269. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakrnan, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 
VA. L. REv. 549, 629-34 (1984). This argument does not hold if the market knows that insiders, 
or others likely to possess superior information, such as arbitrageurs warehousing shares, are 
trading; such trades amount to new information that will lead to a permanently higher price. 
270. See id. at 632; Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988). 
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accumulate losses when they trade with better-informed parties.271 Second, 
somewhat paradoxically, non-insiders with comparatively good information 
also lose out to insiders.272 More generally, anyone unlucky enough to trade 
when insiders are buying up shares based on nonpublic information may be 
characterized as a victim of insider trading. 273 
While none of these victims, taken alone, seems particularly 
sympathetic, thinking in terms of windfalls provides a more powerful 
argument for strictures against insider trading. If insider trading is legal, a 
few insiders receive large, unearned windfalls, 274 while large numbers of 
anonymous investors end up modestly poorer. From a sufficiently remote 
ex ante perspective, nobody knows who is going to be lucky enough to 
stumble across inside information, and thus this reward structure looks like 
a lottery that risk-averse investors will find unattractive. Forbidding insider 
trading spreads gains more broadly and hence is yet another form of reverse 
insurance. In addition, government recoupment of insider trading profits-
windfalls-by civil and criminal prosecutions is an efficient way to raise 
revenue. 
C. State Paying Minimum Price Necessary To Induce Desired Behavior 
The previous Section considered scenarios in which individuals 
received windfalls and the state then captured the gain. This Section 
examines formally distinct, though substantively similar, situations where 
individuals possess items that are of special value to society or are in a good 
position to take some action that benefits society. Instead of capturing 
windfalls in these cases, the government prevents windfalls from occurring 
in the first place by paying no more than is necessary to compensate the 
owner or to elicit desired behavior. Thus, instead of one lucky windfall 
recipient retaining a large gain due to a change in public demand for an 
item or activity that the recipient did not anticipate or plan for, society as a 
whole shares in the windfall. 
271. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, SO 
NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1986). 
272. See id. at 1459. 
273. This statement must be qualified, since determining whether a particular trader is a 
"loser" depends on particular circumstances. For instance, a shareholder liquidating her entire 
portfolio to raise cash for some pressing expenditure would have traded even with full 
knowledge-though she would have received a higher price had the insider made disclosure. A 
shareholder selling only a small portion of her portfolio, on the other hand, might have held onto 
her shares had she known they were likely to rise in value. 
274. This conclusion rests on the pJ;evious analysis demonstrating that insider trading is not a 
sensible form of executive compensation and that it does not serve the social purpose of 
efficiently pricing securities. See supra text accompanying notes 271-273. 
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1. Why Just Just Compensation? 
When the state buys property from its citizens, it (like any other buyer) 
attempts to minimize the purchase price. As long as there is an active 
market, with multiple competing sellers, the government has no need to use 
its power of eminent domain. When the government is trying to buy a 
specific piece of property, however, it is in a bilateral monopoly with one 
landowner.275 As discussed previously, there may well be a wide range of 
prices in which both parties would be happy to contract, and they are likely 
to waste time, effort, and resources fighting for favorable terms.276 
The law of just compensation provides a simple solution: The 
government is required to pay market price and only market price.277 
Though the Just Compensation Clause is traditionally viewed as protective 
of property rights, this is only half true. While it does prevent the 
government from seizing property without any payment, it in effect 
mandates that the government gets all the gains from trade with citizens. 
Property owners may hold out for any price they like with other buyers, but 
the government pays only that price that the property would reach at a fair 
and open auction. 
There are two reasons why this rule is efficient. First, the situation is 
precisely analogous to the private bilateral monopolies discussed 
previously.278 The value of the property to the government-the benefit 
society will reap from the public project-is difficult to gauge. It certainly 
exceeds market value, since that is what the government must pay. The 
value of the property to the government also likely exceeds any supra-
market, or subjective, value attached to the property by the owner. 
Policymakers can thus minimize transaction costs by giving the party likely 
to value the property more highly-here, the government-the right to buy 
at market value. 
· Second, paying anything more than market price would result in 
windfalls for those lucky enough to own property needed for public 
projects, at the expense of the rest of the population, who would have to pay 
higher taxes to fund higher compensation. " [11o permit recovery of value 
that is not created by fair, open market conditions would be to award a few 
275. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 62, 68-72. 
276. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
277. For the leading federal case limiting just compensation to market value, see United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). Two states, Florida and Georgia, deviate from this 
prevailing rule and require the state to award property owners a portion of the gain due to a public 
project See Department of Transp. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1984); Calhoun v. State 
Highway Dep't, 153 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. 1967) (declaring the rule established by Hard v. Housing 
Authority, 132 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. 1963), constitutionally compelled, and hence not alterable by 
statute). See generally 3 SACKMAN, supra note 72, § 8A.02[3]. (describing the minority view that 
an enhancement attributable to a proposed public project is recoverable). 
278. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
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private propertyholders windfall gains solely because of public needs and 
exigencies." 279 To finish what is by now a familiar argument, risk-averse 
people will find such an eminent-domain lottery unattractive; their expected 
wealth is equal in each case and would vary less in a world with lower taxes 
and market value compensation than in a world with higher taxes and 
supra-market compensation. 
What if news of the government's plans leaks out and a speculator buys 
a key piece of property at a price above the existing market price but below 
the value of the land to the government? This roughly describes the facts of 
United States v. Cors,280 in which the Supreme Court held that when the 
government condemned boats for use in World War IT, the Just 
Compensation Clause required the government to pay only the lower prices 
reflecting market conditions before expectations of war increased prices. 
While Cors seems consistent with the rule excluding government-created 
value from just compensation awards, Richard Posner notes some 
complications. 
Posner asks if it should make a difference whether the government 
requisitioned the boats from people who owned them before the market 
price began to rise or from those who bought them from the previous 
owners at the current high price.Z81 He writes: 
This question brings out the administrative complexity of trying to 
base just-compensation law on an aversion to windfalls. Much, 
maybe most, of the property the government takes has benefited 
from government expenditure. A conspicuous example is land 
reclaimed from a lake or river by the Corps of Engineers-but there 
is a sense in which all privately owned land benefits from the 
public expenditures on maintaining law and order, a title-recording 
system, etc. The benefits may long ago have been impounded in the 
price of the land, however, so that payment of full compensation 
will confer no windfall to anyone. And why confiscate just 
condemnees' windfalls?282 
Posner seems to fmd Cors a close call; on the one hand he notes that the 
holding prevented "a capricious wealth distribution from taxpayers to boat 
owners," but on the other hand it seems to lead to the government "taking 
too many boats, because it will not consider the competing needs of the 
remaining private customers for boats." 283 
279. United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less, 605 F.2d 762,782 (5th Cir. 1979). 
280. 337 u.s. 325 (1949). 
281. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 65. 
282. ld. at 65-66. 
283. Id. at 65. 
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Posner raises four distinct issues. First, there would be unbelievable 
"administrative complexity" in trying to capture all windfalls due to value 
created by government acts.284 Of course, to the extent that all citizens 
benefit roughly to the same degree, the presumption is that they did pay for 
the service via taxes of one stripe or another. Moreover, as emphasized in 
Part ll, capture is only worth pursuing in cases of easily identifiable 
windfalls of significant size. In the context of condemnation, for instance, it 
seems worthwhile to discount the large effect of war demand but pointless 
to capture minimal windfalls due to the existence of a recording system, for 
which the property owner has paid, again, via income or property taxes. 
Second, Posner points out that some owners, like our speculator, will 
have paid relatively high prices reflecting the government's planned use.285 
As discussed in Part ll, however, the government can in effect put the 
citizenry on notice that it stands ready to tax away windfalls. The speculator 
then should have known that, per Cors, he should not pay a price that 
reflects a windfall to the seller. The windfall tag, in effect, travels with the 
assets, so owners cannot capture unearned rents simply by selling the goods 
to someone else. 
Third, Posner notes that to the extent the government pays prewar 
prices for boats during wartime, it will divert boats from other users willing 
to pay more and thus, presumably, would put the boats to more valuable 
use?86 This economic truism, however, may not apply during a major war. 
Mass conscription, rationing, and the like seem to give rise to a 
presumption that the war effort comes first-government demand becomes 
categorically higher than all other demand?87 Note too that a high 
percentage of all private demand was to serve the military activities of the 
government, and, assuming the government is rational, it will not bid away 
boats for its direct use that would serve the war effort better in private 
hands. In wartime, then, we presume the government needs almost 
everything more than any other user, and thus condemnation at prewar 
prices to prevent windfalls causes little if any misallocation of resources. 
Finally, Posner asks "why confiscate just condemnee's windfalls?" 288 
This Article answers that the government does capture some other windfalls 
and should capture all windfalls that are ascertainable and large enough to 
merit the effort. Some of the other windfalls he has in mind are too small or 
too difficult to identify. Moreover, putting Cors in a broader context shows 
284. See id. 
285. See id. 
286. See id. 
287. The stakes in World War II could hardly have been higher. When skeptically asked what 
good resulted from the billions of dollars expended on armaments during the struggle, a Nobel 
Prize-winning economist replied, "Well, all we got for those outlays was the salvation of western 
civilization." James Tobin, Seminar on Modem Economics at Yale University (Spring 1984). 
288. POSNER, supra note 39, at 66. 
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that windfall capture can occur in surprising ways. The excess profits taxes 
discussed in Subsection IV.B.2.a.i appeared questionable as a tax on 
windfalls, but may have been quite sensible as cheap proxies for 
condemnation. Eminent domain is much more expensive than simply 
purchasing items in markets. Hence, the government typically employs 
condemnation power only when no real market exists and transaction costs 
are high anyway. When World War IT caused the price of key assets to rise 
sharply, the government, per Cors, could have condemned all necessary 
war material at lower prewar prices. Instead, it more often pursued a two-
step strategy that achieved substantially the same ends via the cheaper 
means of (1) market purchases at war-inflated prices, followed by (2) rough 
capture of the price difference (excess of wartime over prewar prices) via 
the EPT. One commentator described how the existence of the EPT 
obviated the need for government agents to drive hard bargains, since they 
knew the EPT would capture extraordinary profits and return them to the 
public fisc.289 Recharacterized as a surrogate for direct condemnation of war 
supplies, the EPT may have been a quite clever mechanism both to capture 
windfalls and minimize the transaction costs of obtaining war supplies. 
2. Punitive Damage Awards 
Instead of needing specific property in private hands, the government 
often wants to encourage behavior that helps enforce the law. 
Compensatory damage awards, for instance, force people to weigh the costs 
that their acts impose on others and encourages least-cost avoidance of 
harms. Thus, the state permits tort victims to sue for compensatory damages 
in all cases. Tort law permits recovery of punitive damages, however, in 
relatively limited circumstances. 
Economic analysis suggests two situations in which punitive damage 
awards make sense. First, if a particular type of harmful behavior is difficult 
to detect, damages must be increased proportionally so that potential 
wrongdoers, on average, expect to pay for the harm they inflict.29° For 
example, treble damages under the antitrust acts reflect the difficulty of 
detecting and proving collusion in its myriad forms?91 Second, punitive 
289. See CURRAN, supra note 171, at 57. 
290. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, Ill HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998). Polinksy and Shaven at times seem to argue that this is 
the sole grounds for imposing punitive damages: "[P]unitive damages ordinarily should be 
awarded if, and only if, an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes." !d. at 
874. It seems, however, that they would limit this statement to corporations and other artificial 
legal entities. They note elsewhere that real persons who commit intentional torts should be liable 
for punitive damages, even if detection is virtually certain, as it often is for intentional torts like 
assault. See id. at 905-10. 
291. Implicit in treble damages is a belief that victims detect only one in three violations. 
This is a specific example of the general reciprocal rule for calculating punitive damages when 
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damages are a sensible means of deterring intentional wrongs. Awarding 
victims of negligence more than compensatory damages will tend to 
overdeter the productive activity in which the defendant is engaged.292 
When the tort is intentional, however, by definition the defendant was 
engaged in nonproductive or even counterproductive acts, and thus 
overdeterrence is not a worry. To the extent that punitive damages deter 
intentional torts, they save society the cost of the torts and the cost of 
litigating them. 
In either case, punitive damages serve social ends by deterring harmful 
behavior that is either difficult to detect or completely unproductive. While 
the legal system must award plaintiffs some damages in order to encourage 
them to sue wrongdoers and thus deter others from causing harm, 
judgments in excess of the harm inflicted-compensatory damages-seem 
unnecessary to induce lawsuits and hence are a windfall.293 The one 
antitrust plaintiff in three that detects collusion, for example, collects its 
actual damages and then twice that sum again. While it is important to 
assess such a fme against the wrongdoer, there is no reason the award must 
go to the plaintiff. 
Courts have long realized the windfall nature of punitive damages. 
Over a century ago, one judge found it "difficult to understand why, if the 
tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the 
compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is 
punished." 294 Members of the Supreme Court continue to express 
puzzlement over the payment of punitive damages to the plaintiff instead of 
the state.295 The leading torts treatise avers that" [i]t is generally agreed that 
detection is less than certain: Multiply actual damages by one over the odds of detection. Thus, 
the lower the odds of detection, the greater the damages assessed against the wrongdoers caught 
If plaintiffs detect one in three violations, the rule calls for treble damages; if they detect only one 
in 10, punitive damages should be 10 times actual damages. 
More sophisticated approaches account for additional features of real-world litigation. For 
example, if the expense and risk of a lawsuit deters some plaintiffs who detect wrongs from suing, 
the reciprocal rule must reflect this by jacking up damages even higher. See id. at 921. 
292. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 227. Thus, assessing punitive damages equal to 10 times 
actual damages in automobile torts would certainly cause drivers to exercise more care, but 
probably too much care-possibly to the point of ceasing the activity entirely. Driving is a very 
productive activity, economically speaking, and excessive penalties for negligence may cost more 
in precautionary behavior than they gamer in reduced accidents. 
293. An important assumption here is that compensatory damages do indeed fully 
compensate victims so that punitive damages are not needed as some sort of ad hoc supplement to 
bring compensatory damages up to actual damages. 
294. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877). 
295. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Punitive 
damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs .... [T]he penalty should go to the State, 
not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated."); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("These awards are not to compensate victims; 
they are only windfalls."). 
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punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff." 296 There has been a deluge 
of recent law review commentary condemning punitive damages as a 
windfall to plaintiffs and calling for reform.297 
It appears that awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff is a 
historical/procedural artifact. "Although · not meant to . compensate a 
plaintiff, [punitive damages] increase his recovery. He is the fortuitous 
beneficiary of such an award simply because there is no one else to receive 
it." 298 The obvious alternative is to award punitive damages to the state. 
Judges generally have been hesitant about taking such a step themselves.299 
Legislatures in a number of states have passed so-called decoupling statutes 
that award the state a significant share of punitive damages, ranging up to 
seventy-five percent.300 Taxing away the entire punitive damages award, 
like any 100% tax, would be counterproductive: Plaintiffs would have no 
incentive to incur the additional expense of litigating for punitive as well as 
296. W. PAGEKEETONET AL., PROSSERANDKEETONON1HELAWOFTORTS § 2, at 14 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
297. See, e.g., E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
839, 841 (1993) ("One criticism, the 'windfall theory' of punitive damages, is that punitive 
damages are an unjust windfall to civil plaintiffs."); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., 
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1165 (1984) 
(" [P]unitive damages simply provide a windfall to the plaintiff , penalize the innocent consumers 
of society, and unnecessarily sap the vitality of the economy upon which society is totally 
dependent"); James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the 
Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1992) (stating that "commentators and 
courts uniformly [maintain] that punitive damage awards amount to a windfall for plaintiffs, who 
have already been fully compensated by ordinary compensatory damages" (footnote omitted)); 
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 
HARV. L. REv. 1900, 1907 (1992) ("From the plaintiffs perspective, [a large punitive damage 
award] amounts to the legal equivalent of a winning lottery ticket"); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The 
Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 
VAL. U. L. REv. 473, 481 (1993) (finding a "public perception that punitive damages are nothing 
but a windfall to plaintiffs"); Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility of Full State 
Extraction of Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 301, 303 (1994) (advocating "full 
statutory extraction of punitive damages as a means of taking the windfall of punitive damages 
away from the plaintiff and compensating society for the injury the defendant inflicted upon it"); 
see also TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON 1HE LIABILITY CRISIS 52 (1987) 
(" [P]unitive damages by their very nature do not serve to compensate plaintiffs. They are a pure 
windfall, whose only legitimate purpose is to deter truly outrageous and harmful conduct."). 
298. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657,662 (Iowa 1971) (emphasis added). 
299. At least one judge has eschewed such passivity and declared that courts have the 
inherent common-law power, even absent legislation, to divert punitive damage awards from 
plaintiffs to the state. See Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins., 577 So. 2d 878, 886-87 (Ala. 1991) 
(Shores, J., concurring). Justice Shores elaborated on the theme in Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion 
for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards To Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. 
L. REv. 61 (1992). Her colleagues have seemingly found her arguments convincing. See, e.g., 
Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992) (using similar reasoning). 
300. For a fairly recent collection of citations to state statutes decoupling punitive damage 
awards, see BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 617-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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compensatory damages.301 Courts have reached divergent opinions about 
the constitutionality of these legislative attempts to alter the common law. 302 
This flurry of commentary and legislation has coincided with new 
theoretical attacks on plaintiffs' punitive damage windfalls. While it is in 
one sense true that "from the pure perspective of deterrence, the windfall 
concept is irrelevant," 303 in that potential defendants are equally deterred by 
payments to plaintiffs or the state, this ignores the administrative costs of 
the legal system. There is evidence that litigation costs in a given suit 
increase with the amount of damages at stake.304 If so, "[d]ecoupling 
mitigates the propensity of punitive damages awards to encourage 
unnecessary litigation, but does not dilute deterrence because defendants' 
damage payments are unaffected." 305 
This Article's twin reasons for capturing windfalls provide additional 
grounds for diverting punitive damages from plaintiffs to the state. First, 
plaintiffs (hopefully) do not make plans to become victims eligible for 
punitive damage awards, and hence taxing away even a large portion of 
punitive damage awards will not discourage plaintiffs from bringing suits 
and deterring difficult-to-detect or intentional torts. Thus, decoupling 
statutes are an efficient way for the state to raise revenue. Second, in an 
argument no doubt familiar by now, punitive damage awards ex ante are an 
unattractive lottery for a risk-averse population. Reliably lower taxes and 
no chance for a punitive damages windfall offer the same average result as 
higher taxes and a chance to win the punitive damages lottery, but with 
greater predictability. 
3. Criminal Windfalls 
The legal system grants windfalls not only to civil litigants in the form 
of punitive damages, but also to criminal defendants. For instance, even 
those admitting guilt may escape punishment if the government does not 
301. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
302. One state court has held that decoupling statutes violate the Takings Clause, see Kirk v. 
Denver Publ'g, 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a Colorado statute violated the 
Takings Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions), while others have rejected such 
challenges, see, e.g., Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd per 
curiam, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Shepherd Components v. Brice Petrides, 472 N.W.2d 612 
(Iowa 1991). Another court found that a decoupling statute, since it introduced the state into 
private litigation, violated the Excessive Fines and Due Process Clauses. See McBride v. General 
Motors, 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that a Georgia statute violated the Excessive 
Fines Provision and Due Process Clause of the Georgia and federal Constitutions). For a decision 
reaching the opposite conclusion, see Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991). 
303. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive 
Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 58 (1990). 
304. See Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 290, at 923. 
305. Id. 
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provide a speedy trial.306 Perhaps the most well-known criminal windfall is 
the exclusionary rule. Under the modem interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment/07 courts must exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search 
or seizure, regardless of how probative it may be of the defendant's guilt.308 
If excluding evidence obtained illegally was the most effective way to deter 
the police from engaging in illegal searches and seizures, the exclusionary 
rule would not be a windfall for criminals; it would simply be the 
(cheapest) price for upholding a constitutional provision. 
A growing chorus of critics, however, have suggested that the 
exclusionary rule is not the most effective way to deter officials from 
violating Fourth Amendment rights. First and perhaps foremost, it can 
overdeter.309 If the police are worried that the smallest technical misstep 
will result in exclusion of evidence,310 they may forgo perfectly legitimate 
searches, and, as a result, criminals will escape arrest and likely commit 
more crimes. Second, it can underdeter: The exclusionary rule "awards 
windfalls to guilty criminal defendants while offering nothing at all to the 
innocent whose rights are equally violated." 311 Third, the exclusionary rule 
is an ali-or-nothing remedy; there is no way to tailor the penalty to the 
severity of the constitutional violation. Looking in a glove compartment of 
a car becomes the legal.equivalent of breaking down the front door in the 
middle of the night, body-searching every member of the family, and rifling 
through every drawer in the house. Finally, the rule can lead to legal 
outcomes clearly at variance with the truth and thus undermine faith in the 
legal system.312 
Just as decoupling statutes maintain deterrence against private 
tortfeasors while offering a host of advantages over letting plaintiffs retain 
punitive damage awards, critics of the exclusionary rule believe that other 
remedies exist that will effectively deter police misconduct without the 
litany of disadvantages just discussed. By eliminating a windfall for guilty 
defendants, the criminal justice system can have its cake-legal searches 
and seizures-and eat it too--more precisely tailored deterrence and 
conviction of the guilty regardless of the provenance of evidence. 
306. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
307. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
308. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
309. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 749. 
310. Few areas of law can rival the hypertechnical distinctions the courts have drawn 
between legal and illegal searches. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 3.2 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995) ("Protected Areas and Interests"); id., 
§ 3.8 ("Stop and Frisk and Similar Lesser Intrusions"). 
311. CarolS. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820, 848 
(1994). 
312. See generally JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993) 
(outlining at length the problems with constitutional protections of criminal defendants). 
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The prime candidate to replace the exclusionary rule is damage awards 
against officials who engage in illegal searches and seizures. Another 
scholar suggests reducing the sentences of criminals convicted with 
illegally obtained evidenc~.313 Judges can calibrate these alternatives to 
match the seriousness of any constitutional violation, and, for this reason, 
overdeterrence is unlikely. Damages have the advantage of providing a 
remedy for the innocent as well as the guilty. Both vindicate the important 
social goal of rendering judgments that reflect the truth. If either or both of 
the alternative remedies can deter police misconduct at least as effectively 
as the exclusionary rule, they offer a host of additional benefits to society 
instead of a windfall to the guilty. 
Criminal procedure reform seems a long way from the Windfall Profit 
Tax on Oil. Although the means differ significantly, society's goal in both 
cases-and in every other example studied in this Part-is identical: Take 
windfalls from their recipients and share the bounty with everyone. Thus, 
there is a unifying theme behind the disparate legal rules, an important 
theme for policymaking. That elected governments have seen fit to 
effectuate windfall capture in such a wide variety of circumstances is strong 
evidence that people are risk-averse regarding upside risk and desire 
sharing rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Optimal tax theory and individuals' risk aversion provide powerful 
efficiency justifications for capturing large and easily identified windfalls-
gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that 
society wishes to reward. These redistributions can impose significant 
transaction and administrative costs and, moreover, can undermine 
incentives to behave productively. Thus, this Article has tempered 
optimism about windfall capture with cautionary discussions of contexts in 
which windfalls do not exist or the costs of capture exceed the benefits. 
For example, capture is never desirable for private windfalls, where the 
number of winners and losers is relatively small. Misunderstanding what 
constitutes a windfall, courts overseeing private litigation often ignore the 
value of planning, identify windfalls where none exist, and undermine the 
incentives to engage in prudent forethought. Ironically, the very term 
windfall arose from a practice that likely involved nothing akin to an 
unearned gain.314 It seems highly unlikely that the Crown and its nobles, 
lords of the medieval English forests, would have permitted peasants to 
313. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 
796 (1994). 
314. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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haul away windfallen branches that could have been harvested at any 
noticeable profit. The value of the wood shorn from trees as a result of 
storms, then, probably exceeded the labor cost of collecting it by only a 
small margin. The sovereign and the lords, it seems, simply abandoned their 
rights to a resource not worth recovering for commercial purposes. Peasants 
able to harvest the fallen branches at the least cost (for example, those 
living closest to the forests or those with the lowest opportunity cost for 
their time) would derive some marginal benefit from the free source of 
wood. This woodgathering differed little from modern-day soda can 
gathering: The recovery by the poor of low-value property abandoned by 
the (relatively) wealthy. Thus, the original windfall was no windfall at all. 
When private windfalls actually exist, it is often too expensive to return 
the subject property to its true owner. In such cases, there are often wider 
social goals that dictate which party should get the windfall. Even when 
there is no societal interest at stake, attempted state capture of most private 
windfalls is not feasible: The costs of detection are high, and all the 
government accomplishes by imposing a windfall tax is to raise transaction 
costs among those few parties with knowledge of the lucky gain. 
For public windfalls, where the number of winners and losers is large, 
detection is cheap and easy. Still, policymakers must proceed with caution 
in this context as well. Misguided capture mechanisms, such as the wartime 
excess profits taxes, fail to account properly for high administrative and 
deadweight costs. There is good reason to believe, however, that the 
Windfall Profit Tax on Oil provides a model for efficient capture. While 
necessarily complex, windfall capture mechanisms are becoming steadily 
more feasible for wealthier societies possessing powerful tools to gather 
and process information. 
It is impossible to anticipate where and when future public windfalls 
will arise; by definition such events are surprises. Some hypothetical 
examples, however, help illustrate how modern states' expanding ability to 
gather and digest information may help separate windfallen chaff from 
earned wheat. Assume that later patent Y makes earlier patent X much more 
valuable in a way that, given the details of patent X, the inventor of X 
clearly never anticipated. If the state can make this determination with 
confidence, it should tax away the royalties earned by X that are attributable 
to Y. Similarly, the surprising growth of the Internet may make all the wires 
going into private homes more valuable as they become conduits for Web 
material in addition to data they were originally designed to carry (voice for 
phone wiring, video for cable television). If the companies never expected 
this incremental revenue stream, the state has a strong case for taxing away 
telephone and cable companies' profits due to Internet use. A government 
able to gather and analyze extensive data on the telephone and cable 
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industries may be able to determine with sufficient confidence that their 
gains from the explosion in Internet use were largely unexpected windfalls. 
Even when the case for capture is not clear, the windfall concept is a 
useful tool for thinking about a variety of issues, from progressive taxation 
to escheat, from insider trading to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary 
rule. In all of these contexts, this Article has offered a consistent way to 
think about how society should deal with unearned benefits. 
